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1.0 Background 
Introduction 
A well functioning disease surveillance system is critical for providing 
evidence-based information to use in planning, implementing, monitoring 
and evaluating public health intervention programmes. Recognizing the 
need to coordinate disease surveillance resources and strengthening the role 
of surveillance in the control of communicable diseases, the World Health 
Organization African Regional Office (WHO/AFRO) developed an 
integrated approach to streamline approaches to disease surveillance and 
response.1,2 Since its adoption in 1998, the Integrated Disease Surveillance 
(IDS) strategy has been implemented with encouraging success in many 
countries in the African Region. 3,4 
The specific goals of Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) 
are to strengthen district-level surveillance and response for priority 
diseases, to integrate surveillance with laboratory support, and to translate 
information generated from surveillance and laboratory data into specific 
public health actions. 5,6 
 
The successful detection, characterization and tracing of disease 
transmission that is essential for the prevention and control of public health 
events requires an efficient public health laboratory (PHL) system. As a 
result, WHO-AFRO’s Regional Committee adopted resolution 
AFR/RC43/R7 that urged Member States to develop well-staffed and 
properly equipped laboratory support that can contribute to the 
strengthening of the disease surveillance system at the national level. 7 
                                                 
1 World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa. Integrated Disease Surveillance in the African Region, a regional strategy for 
communicable diseases 1999-2003.  
2 World Health Organization, Regional office for Africa, Centres for Disease Control and Prevention Technical Guidelines for IDSR in 
the African Region Atlanta, Georgia. Public Health Service, Centres for Disease Control and Prevention/Epidemiology Program Office, 
Division of International Health; National Centre for Infectious Diseases, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases. July 2001:10-11. 
Detect and respond to Priority Diseases    (http://www.cdc.gov/idsr/IDSR_resources/detection/detect_respond_eng.pdf) 
3 World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa. Regional Committee Resolution AFR/RC 48 /R2, 1998 
4 World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa. Documentation of IDSR implementation in the WH WHO African Region: 
Summary of the Synthesis Report, CDER, May 2003 
5
 Perry HP, McDonnell SM, Alemu W, Nsubuga P, Chungong S, Otten MW Jr, Lusamba-dikassa P and Thacker SB.  Planning an 
integrated disease surveillance and response system: a matrix of skills and activities.  BMC Medicine 2007, 5:24 available from 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/5/24 
6
 McNabb S JN, Chungong S, Ryan M, Wuhib T, Nsubuga P, Alemu W, Carandekulis V and Rodier G: Conceptual framework of public 
health surveillance and action and its implication in health sector reform. BMC Public Health 2002 ,2:2 
7 World Health Organization: Regional Office for Africa .Regional Committee Resolution AFR/RC 43 /R7, 1993 
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A public health laboratory network in a country may involve disease-
specific and clinical investigations performed in Ministry of Health and 
other national institute laboratories.  Support to the laboratories may come 
through a single disease program or a collection of diseases.  The purpose of 
the public health laboratory network is to improve the performance of 
laboratories in support of disease surveillance and response.  The network 
functions include provision of training, supplies, equipment and quality 
assurance so that tests can be performed and laboratory data linked to 
surveillance activities.  The result is the availability of timely laboratory 
data on confirmation of suspected pathogens during outbreaks.  The 
laboratory data set the stage for an evidence based investigation and 
implementation of appropriate control interventions. Monitoring of 
laboratory data for existing, emerging and re-emerging pathogens, as well as 
for drug resistance of pathogens that cause epidemics can provide early 
warning of public health events. The laboratory data can provide evidence 
for introduction of new vaccines, updating of existing vaccine composition, 
and guidelines on treatment and prevention policies and protocols at both 
national and regional levels. Building laboratory capacity including 
networking at national and regional levels is therefore essential for 
successful implementation of the IDSR strategy. 
 
The WHO Regional Office for Africa in collaboration with the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), USA and other partners is 
developing a regional strategy to strengthen national public health 
laboratories (NPHL). The laboratory-strengthening strategy focuses on 
public health laboratory diagnostics for selected priority diseases and 
contributes to sustainable implementation of integrated, multi-disease 
surveillance and response activities. The laboratory strengthening strategy 
covers three broad areas, namely: 
• Collecting, analyzing, and reporting laboratory data and using this 
information for public health action. 
• Establishing appropriate, accurate, and sustainable diagnostic 
practice 
• Linking public health laboratory diagnostics with National and 
Regional surveillance activities 
 11 
 
For greater efficiency, public health laboratories need to be organized within 
a national public health laboratory network (NPHLN) through appropriate 
links to sub-regional, regional and international laboratory networks. Initial 
efforts in many countries have aimed to provide data through organized 
networks for high priority epidemic-prone bacterial diseases including 
cholera, dysentery, meningococcal meningitis, and plague. With the 
growing concern of emerging and re-emerging diseases, network activities 
may now include avian influenza (AI), tuberculosis (TB), malaria and 
HIV/AIDS. As laboratory network activities mature, other etiologic agents 
specific to local, regional and or international public health threats should be 
included.  
Purpose of the guideline  
While this guideline presents recommendations that can be applied to multi-
disease laboratory networks, a particular emphasis is placed on providing 
laboratory data for high priority bacterial diseases including cholera, 
dysentery, meningitis and plague.   
 
The purpose of this guideline is to: 
• Define the purpose of a public health laboratory network 
• Define the components of a public health laboratory network 
• Describe the coordination of a laboratory network  
• Provide general guidance for establishing and strengthening a 
national laboratory network, and 
• Promote linkages with WHO collaborating centres, other 
international laboratories and specific disease program partners. 
• Facilitate the development of national laboratory network policy  
Target audience 
This guide is intended for the national ministry of health (MoH) laboratory 
focal point or chief officer who oversees all the laboratories in the country, 
the coordinator of the NPHLN, and the laboratory personnel. Other users of 
this guide may include IDSR focal persons at all levels, training officers, 
curriculum developers, and Ministries of Health and their partners.   
 12 
Application of the guideline 
The laboratory focal person or chief medical officer can use this guide to 
develop a plan to establish or strengthen a NPHLN. This guideline can be used 
to advocate for political commitment and funding at national levels in support 
of laboratory strengthening to improve detection, confirmation, response, and 
prevention of priority infectious diseases. The guideline is also useful for 
laboratory personnel so they know and comply with its objectives and content. 
 
 
2. Situation analysis 
Access to reliable diagnostic testing facilities is among the major challenges 
in Africa contributing to the delay or lack of appropriate and timely 
response to outbreaks and quality patient care. Despite the growing threat 
from emerging and re-emerging pathogens including HIV, TB and malaria 
as well as Avian Influenza (AI), the majority of an estimated 12 million 
annual deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa remain uninvestigated. Laboratory 
investigations continue to be undervalued as evidenced by lack of skilled 
manpower for quality-control and reproducible laboratory testing. This 
contributes to the widespread use of empiric patient care in Africa which 
would not be tolerated in other countries. 8,9 
 
Other major barriers for laboratory capacity in Africa include: lack of funds, 
weak health infrastructure, lack of basic essential equipment and laboratory 
consumables, scarcity of educators and training programs, inadequate 
logistical support, insufficient monitoring of test quality, de-emphasis of 
laboratory testing and inadequate representation of laboratory personnel in 
health policy development and implementation of public health 
interventions. This situation calls for a major investment to building 
capacity for epidemiological surveillance and public health laboratories in 
Africa.  
                                                 
8
 Bates I and Maitland K. Are laboratory services coming of age in Sub-Saharan Africa? Editorial Commentary. CID 2006:42(1February) 
383-384 
 
9
 Martin R, Hearn T, Ridderhof J, and Demby A.  Implementation of a quality systems approach for laboratory practice in resource-
constrained countries. AIDS (2005). 19 (supplement 2), S59-S65. 
 13 
 
Despite the above challenges, exemplary achievements have been 
documented in the region.  For example, polio surveillance activities take 
place even in countries with difficult terrain and security risks. This finding 
suggests that given appropriate resources and commitment similar 
achievements can be obtained in improving laboratory support to strengthen 
implementation of IDSR.  
 
Example of polio laboratory network 
The polio activities in many countries are successfully supported by 
multiple partners including WHO, UNICEF, NGOs and bilateral agencies. 
The activity is well organized and includes active surveillance visits by field 
assistants (FA) covering a large portion of the countries. Case notification 
and arrangement for stool specimen collection and transportation are 
communicated immediately through radio and email. Stool specimens are 
frozen and shipped to the central laboratories from where they are 
transferred to the polio reference laboratory in the country or to the 
designated laboratory in the sub-region for viral isolation. Subsequently, 
isolates requiring Intra-Typic Differentiation (ITD) are sent to the 
WHO/AFRO Regional Reference Laboratory (RRL) in South Africa.    
 
A data manager for Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) receives hard copies of 
the AFP initial and detailed case investigation forms from the field and 
laboratory results from central laboratories. In collaboration with the 
program coordinator, data is cleaned and edited, while data entry and 
analysis are centralized under the technical officers in the sub-region or 
region. Zero reports and work plans are submitted monthly. Most countries 
in the region have achieved the polio certification level surveillance targets 
for all indicators since 2002 and have maintained it since then. The lessons 
learned from polio have been useful for measles surveillance systems which 
were integrated into AFP surveillance in a number of countries.10, 11 
 
   
                                                 
10 World Health Organization. Strengthening surveillance and response for epidemic-prone and vaccine-preventable diseases in selected 
African and Eastern Mediterranean countries (WHO/CDS/CSR/LYO/2005.23) 
11 The Global Polio Laboratory Network: A Model for   Good Laboratory Practice 
http://www.qaproject.org/pubs/pubstechreports.html#globalpolionetworks 
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WHO/AFRO and national public health laboratories 
WHO/AFRO in collaboration with partners has conducted various activities 
designed to strengthen public health laboratory (PHL) capacity in countries. 
These include establishment of sub-regional and regional reference 
laboratories, organization of annual meetings for directors of National 
Public Health Reference Laboratories (NPHRL), assessment and 
documentation of national reference laboratories’ (NRL) capacity, and 
training of laboratory scientists on standard laboratory methods and 
procedures. 12 
 
WHO/AFRO in collaboration with WHO/Lyon has also organized a two 
year training program, alternating between course time spent in WHO 
laboratory training centers in Lyon, France and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso 
and application of the training in the trainees’ own countries. The purpose of 
the training is to encourage good public health laboratory practice, 
encourage better management of national laboratory services and narrow the 
gap between field epidemiology and diagnostic laboratory services.  
 
The AFRO public health laboratory network (see Figure 1) includes national 
reference centers, sub-regional and regional reference laboratories for 
specific diseases and a WHO Collaborating Centers for plague.  These 
laboratories have adopted the WHO recommended standard materials, 
methods and operating procedures for cholera, bacillary dysentery, bacterial 
meningitis and plague. They have been provided with essential reagents and 
antigens to enable rapid investigation and confirmation of outbreaks.  They 
have also been supplied with computers, fax machines and e-mail 
connection to enhance fast transmission of information.  
 
Among the seventeen countries in the West Epidemiological Bloc,  14 
(82%) of the countries regularly send laboratory data on meningitis and 
diarrhoeal diseases on a weekly basis to WHO. Laboratory-based 
surveillance of meningitis epidemics has played a significant role in the 
timely outbreak response.  Countries in the meningitis belt regularly provide 
laboratory data on a weekly basis.  Feedback on this data is given to all 
                                                 
12 Centres for Disease Control and prevention-USA. IDS Update Bulletin. IDSR links with other surveillance programs. Update 
Bulletin, Vol 2, Fall 2001 
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contributing laboratories.  A monthly bulletin on epidemiological and 
laboratory data is also issued and shared with countries and partners.  The 
regular analysis of laboratory data allows countries to predict the circulating 
meningitis serotype and thus the appropriate selection of a vaccine.  
 
WHO/AFRO External Quality Assessment Programme  
The WHO/NICD microbiology External Quality Assessment (EQA) 
programme was started in May 2002. Presently, over 72 laboratories in 45 
African countries participate in this programme. Globally, the EQA 
programme assesses the laboratory capacity to detect the epidemic prone 
disease, specifically meningitis caused by Neisseria meningitidis, 
Streptococcus pneumoniae and Haemophilus influenza; enteric disease 
caused by Salmonella, Shigella, Vibrio cholerae, enteropathogenic E. coli 
and plague caused by Y. pestis. In addition, this programme assesses the 
laboratory capacity to diagnose malaria and tuberculosis. Since October 
2005, 63 Laboratories in 45 countries are involved in an EQA scheme for 
malaria microscopy. Tuberculosis smears were added to the existing 
WHO/NICD EQA programme in October 2005 and currently, 62 
laboratories now participate.13, 14 
 
Fig 1: WHO/AFRO Public Health Laboratory Network 
                                                 
13. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention-USA. IDS Update Bulletin. Documentation of IDSR implementation in the African & 
Eastern Mediterranean Regions. Update Bulletin, issue 4 , 2003 
14 World Health Organization, Country office in collaboration with Great Lakes Epidemiologic Bloc. IDS/Health Information Bulletin 
Integrated Disease Surveillance & Response 
www.cdc.gov/idsr/files/CSR_Bulletin_Dec_02_Volume_7/CSR_Bulletin_Dec_02_Volume_7.htm#lab 
AFRO Public Health Laboratory Network
INRSP, Bamako
MRC, Banjul
IP, Abidjan CPC,Yaounde
KEMRI, Nairobi
INRB, Kinshasa
UTH, Lusaka
NHLS, Johannesburg
IP, Antananarivo
SUB-REGIONAL
REFERENCE LAB
REGIONAL AND SUB-
REGIONAL 
REFERENCE LAB
NATIONAL
REFERENCE LAB
WHO CC PLAGUE
F  Public ealth aboratory et ork
INRSP, Bamako
MRC, Banjul
IP, Abidjan CPC,Yaounde
KEMRI, Nairobi
INRB, Kinshasa
UTH, Lusaka
NHLS, Johannesburg
IP, Antananarivo
SUB-REGIONAL
REFERENCE LAB
REGIONAL AND SUB-
REGIONAL 
REFERENCE LAB
NATIONAL
REFERENCE LAB
WHO CC PLAGUE
 16 
 
3.0 Justification 
During the past decades, over 30 new pathogens were detected globally, and 
many of them were responsible for serious outbreaks. Furthermore, there is 
a growing problem of antibiotic resistance.  Seventy percent of bacteria that 
cause hospital infections in many countries are resistant to at least one of the 
drugs most commonly used to treat infections 15. In order to deal with these 
challenges, a well-functioning laboratory is critical for confirmation of 
clinical diagnosis and the conduct of reliable infectious disease surveillance.  
 
The PHLs generate information that is essential for guiding responses to 
infectious disease outbreaks by public health practitioners, epidemiologists 
and clinicians.  The information is also essential for the establishment of 
national health policy and epidemic preparedness. They also serve as a 
repository for confirmatory tests and diagnostic tests for rarely encountered 
pathogens such as Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic viruses, Yersinia pestis, 
Rickettsia prowazekii, and Bartonella quintana. 
 
To address the weak diagnostic capacity for supporting effective 
surveillance of epidemic-causing infectious diseases, emerging pathogens, 
and the emergence of resistance to anti-microbial agents in the African 
region, the 43rd session of the WHO Regional Committee for Africa 
adopted Resolution AFR/RC43/R7 in 1993, declaring a five-year period for 
preventing and combating epidemics of communicable diseases through 
improved epidemiological surveillance at the district level. The Resolution, 
further considered that  “the frequent occurrence in the African Region of 
epidemics such as cholera, plague, yellow fever, malaria, cerebrospinal 
meningitis (CSM) brings untold human suffering and loss of lives”, and 
therefore urged Member States to “develop well-staffed and properly 
equipped laboratory services”. 
                                                 
15 World Health Organization, Regional Office for South-East Asia New Delhi. Laboratory Support to Emerging Diseases. 
www.whoindia.org/LinkFiles/Public_Health_Laboratory_Networking_SEARO_recommendations_on_networking_of_PHL.pdf 
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In 1996, Ministers of Health and Ministers of Interior from 16 West Africa 
countries, joined by Chad and Algeria, met in Ouagadougou to consider 
ways and means of preventing future epidemics. Similarly, their 
counterparts from countries of the Great Lakes met in Kigali in 1997 to 
deliberate on the unabated epidemics of infectious diseases.  At the 
conclusion of these meetings, the Ministers “… acknowledged that the 
unduly long delay in identifying and confirming the causal agents of these 
epidemics, retard the initiation of action likely to contain epidemics, 
resulting in catastrophic loss of lives” and called for a systematic evaluation 
of the state of laboratories in their respective countries, and resolved to 
strengthen laboratory diagnostic capability in Member States. Protocols for 
co-operation in the prevention and control of epidemics have been signed by 
Ministers of Interior and Health in all 5 blocs - West Africa (1996), Great 
Lakes (1997), Horn of Africa (1998), Central Africa (1998) and Southern 
Africa and Indian Ocean (1999) blocs. 
   
The NPHLs, regardless of their location, are important sentinel sites for 
surveillance of infectious diseases of international concern such as viral 
influenza infections, and should be an integral part of the global network of 
laboratories. It is therefore important that they be linked into an effective 
national communication network. Network formation can assist members in 
a variety of ways and facilitates the timely and effective use of PHL 
information to guide the selection of appropriate interventions. 
 
4. Essential public health laboratory functions  
In many Ministry of Health laboratories, there is an overlap of clinical and 
public health testing.  Results for clinical diagnostics may take place in the 
same laboratory where public health laboratory tests are conducted to 
provide information for decision makers to enact appropriate disease control 
measures. The focus of the clinical diagnostic testing is the individual 
patient care. In contrast, the concern of public health laboratory testing is the 
community at large. Data generated from both services are essential for 
surveillance activities.  
 18 
 
The functions of a public health laboratory include provision of the following: 
• Timely laboratory confirmation of disease pathogens for 
surveillance, including epidemic alert, response and prevention, 
and monitoring microbiological safety of food and water. 
• Policy, standards, and advocacy for public and private laboratory 
services. 
• Training and continuing education for laboratory personnel on 
laboratory techniques, use of equipment, and appropriate and safe 
collection, storage and transportation of specimens. 
• Strengthened rapid response to outbreaks through timely testing of 
specimens and identification of the causative agents and ensuring 
the capacity to process a large volume of specimens in an 
emergency situation. 
• Laboratory support during outbreak investigation in order to 
determine the source of infection; identify carriers and reservoirs 
of infection in the environment; monitor epidemiologic trends to 
detect epidemiologic shifts; and assure rapid analysis and 
dissemination of laboratory information. 
• Specialized tests (or access to such testing facilities, e.g., WHO 
Collaborating Centers) for unusual events and emerging infections, 
and for monitoring antimicrobial resistance. 
• Testing to meet specific needs of public health agencies 
• Coordination and promotion of quality assurance programs for 
clinical and environmental laboratories including training, 
consultation, certification and proficiency testing. 
• Scientific and managerial leadership in development of public 
health policy. 
• Research and development capacities by sponsoring researchers 
and creating a forum for sharing research findings. 
 
 
 
In order to deliver these essential functions, it is of paramount importance that the 
people holding leadership positions in the national public health laboratory service 
have the appropriate education background including the relevant qualifications and 
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skills as well as attitudes to effectively coordinate and build a team.  Ensuring that 
critical factors are in place such as political commitment at the highest level, 
adequate budget and appropriate organizational and functional structure is the key 
for a sustainable high standard of delivery of services. 
 
5. Establishing National Public Health Laboratory Network 
5.1 Definition of a National Public Health Laboratory Network 
A national public health laboratory network (NPHLN) is composed of 
laboratories at each level of the health system (health centre, district, 
regional/provincial, national) committed to the proper diagnosis of priority 
infectious diseases for public health decision making. The laboratories in a 
functional laboratory network have established communication channels for 
routine communication, exchange of information, and interaction in 
specified ways with each other, and with epidemiology departments at the 
level of the national IDSR program. The national public health laboratory 
may also communicate and interact as necessary with sub-regional and 
regional WHO networks and with international collaborating centres. The 
aim of the functional network is to provide strategic advice and share 
expertise to strengthen national capacity for laboratory services to support 
disease surveillance and control.  
 
A template of the terms of reference (TOR) for a national public health 
laboratory network (NPHLN) is available in Annex 1 of this document. 
 
 5.2 Goal of a National Public Health Laboratory Network 
 
The goal of a national public health laboratory network is to provide high 
quality, accurate and timely laboratory-based information.  This information 
can be used for public health decisions directed at effective control and 
prevention of priority diseases in the country and potential public health 
emergencies of international concern. 
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 5.3 Ensuring a successful National Public Health Laboratory Network  
When establishing a national public health laboratory network, the 
following guiding principles need to be observed. 
• National ownership and leadership: Provide national ownership and 
leadership for the NPHLN to ensure sustainable and effective 
implementation of IDSR. The NPHLN should be linked with the 
national multi-disciplinary surveillance coordinating body 
established to coordinate the implementation of IDSR such as a task 
force or steering committee. 
• National policy on laboratory services: Establish national public 
health and clinical laboratory policy that clearly defines roles of 
laboratories for the different levels. 
• Resource management: The need for long-term sustained efforts to 
ensure the budget flow, supply skilled human resources, supply and 
maintain essential laboratory equipment, reagents and supplies and 
develop infrastructure development for NPHLN. 
• Partnership: Expanded partnership with clear definition of roles and 
contributions of each partner at national, intermediate and district 
levels. Through the NPHLN, establish contact with similar networks 
at sub-regional, regional and international levels.                       
• Access to quality laboratory services: Equitable access to quality 
public health laboratory services with greater attention to the district 
level especially in rural, semi-urban and underserved areas.   
• Standardization: Building on acceptable international standards and 
norms for quality laboratory tests adapted to suit the local 
epidemiological context and overall guidance of WHO 
recommendations in selecting cost effective methods. 
5.4 Policy and procedures  
The NPHLN provides technical leadership in public health laboratory 
services for disease surveillance, prevention and control and for guiding 
public health policy development. This could be achieved through 
provision of scientific and technical leadership; establishing contacts 
with scientific and technical regional and international networks to forge 
partnerships for surveillance, outbreak alertness and response and 
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facilitating establishment of national laboratory policy that clearly 
defines roles of laboratories at all levels.  
 
The network could also play critical role in promoting integration of 
high quality laboratory science into public health practice; supporting 
development of laboratory standard operating procedures (SOP), 
documentation of experiences and assisting the development of level-
specific guidelines as well as advocating the need to strengthen national 
laboratory systems amongst decision-makers, partners and the public.  
5.5 Membership in the NPHLN 
Network membership should have as its focus the NPHL, or its functional 
equivalent (for example, the NRL). Network members include teaching or 
tertiary level hospital laboratories, laboratories of disease specific programs, 
major private medical laboratories, and provincial/regional and district 
reference hospital laboratories.  
5.6 Coordination of the NPHLN 
The MoH should officially establish the NPHLN and designate an Advisory 
Committee (technical committee) to guide coordination and management of 
the network. Members of the Advisory Committee may vary from country 
to country but, as a minimum, should include senior microbiologists (or 
medical laboratory specialists), virologists, clinicians (infectious disease 
specialists) and an epidemiologist or public health specialist. As an example, 
terms of reference for a technical committee in Uganda is included as Annex 
2 of this document. 
 
The NPHL or the designated NRL is responsible for coordination of the 
laboratory network at the national level. In order to effectively coordinate 
the functioning of the NPHLN, the leadership should have the appropriate 
technical, interpersonal and managerial competencies. These individuals 
must also have the necessary authority and accountability for managing their 
laboratories, and be able to communicate with the appropriate levels of the 
public health system.  
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5.7 Administration and management of NPHLN  
The Ministry of Health laboratory focal point and the director of designated 
reference laboratory will be the responsible administrative focal person for 
the effective functioning of the network in the country. To ensure proper 
functioning of the network, regular meetings should be held at the national 
level at least once a year with participation of representatives from all levels 
of the NPHLN. Participants of the meetings should share their experiences, 
achievements, challenges and discuss ways of strengthening performance of 
the network to support and actively participate in the national disease 
surveillance and response. An example of one country’s terms of reference 
for the Laboratory Focal Point for Epidemic Prone Diseases is available in 
Annex 3 of this document. 
5.8 Structure of NPHLN 
The NPHLN should be based on a pyramidal structure with the NPHL or the 
designated reference laboratory at the top of the pyramid followed by 
provincial or regional, district and peripheral and health centre laboratories 
(please see Figure 2). The laboratory activities should be defined for each 
level and address a common list of priority activities for all health centre 
laboratories.  A complementary package for district and provincial/regional 
laboratories along with specification of specialized tests for central referral 
laboratories should also be designated. The laboratories should also be 
provided with the standard operating procedures relevant to the functions 
appropriate for their level.   
 
 23 
Figure 2: Structure of national public health laboratory network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The NPHLN is placed under the responsibility of the NRL as designated by 
the MoH. In order to develop a vision and to guide policy for public health 
laboratories, the MoH should ensure adequate representation for the 
laboratories by creating a division of laboratories at central level.This 
directorate should be headed by a laboratory expert.  
 
The position of Director of NPHL should be at the level of Deputy Director 
of Medical Services or equivalent and at the same level with other heads of 
divisions at the MoH and reporting directly to director of Medical Services. 
It is further recommended that the Directorate of NPHL be separated from 
other major assignments such as Pharmacy, Diagnostic Imaging and Blood 
Transfusions Services in order to enhance his or her commitment in 
management and advocacy for the Public Health Laboratories. 
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5.9 Functions of the NPHL 
National Public Health Laboratories (NPHL) should act as the first line of 
defense for the rapid recognition of priority communicable diseases and 
contribute to preventing their spread. The NPHL plays a role in 
strengthening these activities through enhancing communications between 
the different levels and facilitating access for laboratory activities 
particularly for: 
• Development of policy and enforcement of standards 
• Referral of specimen/isolates to a Regional Reference Laboratory 
(RRL) for confirmation and specialized testing as necessary  
• Training of laboratory technicians/technologists in diagnostic 
techniques & bio safety procedures 
• Training of intermediate, district and peripheral health care facility 
staff  in specimen collection, safe handling, storage and shipment to 
the referral laboratory   
• Monitoring of anti-microbial resistance of priority diseases including 
S. dysenteriae type 1, and multi-drug resistant TB (MDR XDR -TB).   
• Establishment of internal and external quality assessment and quality 
control systems.  
• Making available a national strain bank for epidemic prone diseases 
permitted for the level of laboratory 
• Following up the implementation of regular appropriate upkeep and 
maintenance of laboratory equipment 
• Collecting, compiling, analyzing and sharing laboratory data with 
network laboratories, MoH, WHO and other partners 
• Publishing feedback bulletins and dissemination (electronic and print 
newsletters, issue briefs, training materials, survey reports, 
conference proceedings and other resources) to all concerned.  
 
The recommended actions for the PHLN at the different levels are 
summarized in Annex 4 of this document. 
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5.10 Laboratory specimens 
5.10.1 Priority diseases requiring laboratory confirmation 
The priority diseases that are the leading causes of illness, death and 
disability in the African region are listed in Annex 5 of this guideline.  
These diseases are divided into three groups: epidemic-prone diseases, 
diseases targeted for eradication or elimination, and other diseases of 
public health importance. The list of priority diseases varies from country 
to country and may be updated from time to time.16 Note: As of 2008, 
WHO AFRO IDSR guidelines are undergoing a major revision and 
additional diseases are being added.  Those current diseases requiring 
laboratory confirmation are listed in the table below. The priority diseases 
are a combination of communicable and non-communicable diseases, and 
not all of them require laboratory testing for confirmation.  In some cases, 
the disease control program such as the Expanded Programme on 
Immunization may already support laboratory networks to detect and 
confirm polio and measles. 
 
The following priority diseases require laboratory confirmation.  Please note 
that the causative agent for the first four epidemic-prone diseases are 
bacterial pathogens addressed in this guide.  
 
Epidemic-prone 
diseases 
• Cholera 
• Diarrhoea with blood (S. dysenteriae, type 1) 
• Meningococcal meningitis 
• Plague 
• Viral hemorrhagic fevers 
• Yellow fever 
• Avian influenza 
Diseases targeted 
for eradication or 
elimination 
• Poliomyelitis (AFP) 
• Measles 
Endemic epidemics • Malaria 
• Tuberculosis 
• HIV 
 
                                                 
16
 World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa and Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. Technical Guideline for 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in the African Region, May 2002 
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5.10.2 Types of lab specimens and tests at different levels  
The proposed list of specimens to be collected for each priority infectious 
disease caused by a bacterial agent with the relevant laboratory test to be 
conducted at each is shown in Table 2. At the district level, specimens are 
inoculated onto an appropriate transport media for safe shipment to the 
referral laboratory. Reference laboratories may perform additional testing 
such as confirmation of strains, verification of some sensitivity testing for 
unusual resistance or sensitivity to an antibiotic. Some laboratories may also 
be able to perform PCR to confirm a pathogen. 
Table 2: Recommended types of tests by disease and levels  
Levels Diseases Types of tests 
Cholera:  
  
• Macroscopic examination 
• Microscopic examination for “shooting star” pattern for V.cholerae 
• Inoculation of transport media (Cary Blair, APW) 
• Rapid test if available  
Meningitis:  
 
• Macroscopic and microscopic examination (direct & after Gram 
staining on sediment from centrifugation) 
• Latex agglutination test for N. meningitidis, S.pneumoniae and Hib 
(if possible) 
• Inoculation of media transport (Trans-Isolate bottle) 
Plague:  
 
• Microscopic examination after Gram staining bubo aspiration or 
sputum 
• Dipstick testing on bubo aspiration or sputum 
• Inoculation of transport media (Cary Blair) 
•  Collect and ship blood sample to the reference laboratory for serology 
testing               
Diarrhea with 
blood 
• Macroscopic  examination 
• Inoculation of transport media (Cary Blair) 
Tuberculosis: • Acid fast bacilli (AFB) staining technique for TB (at TB centers) 
District 
Gonococcus • Microscopic examination after Gram stain on urethral pus 
Cholera • Vibrio cholerae isolation from stool specimens and antimicrobial 
resistance testing 
Diarrhea with 
blood  
• isolation of S. dysenteriae type 1 from stool specimens and 
antimicrobial resistance testing 
 
Meningitis 
• Macroscopic and microscopic examination (direct & after Gram 
staining on sediment from centrifugation) 
. Latex agglutination test for N. meningitidis, S.pneumoniae and Hib 
• Culture, identification and antimicrobial resistance testing if possible 
Tuberculosis: • Acid fast bacilli (AFB) staining technique for TB (at TB centers) 
Provincial 
Gonococcus • Microscopic examination after Gram stain on urethral pus 
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Diarrhea with 
blood  
• Isolation of S. dysenteriae type 1 from stool specimens & 
antimicrobial resistance testing 
Cholera • Isolation of Vibrio cholerae O1 from stool specimens specimens & 
antimicrobial resistance testing 
Meningitis 
• Microscopic examination (direct & after Gram staining on sediment 
from centrifugation)) 
• Latex agglutination test for N. meningitidis, S.pneumoniae and Hib 
• Culture, identification and antimicrobial resistance testing  
• PCR(if possible) 
Plague • Yersinia pestis isolation from bubo or sputum and antimicrobial 
resistance testing  
Tuberculosis • Culture, identification and Antimicrobial resistance testing  
Central 
Gonococcus • Isolation of N gonorrhoeae from urethral pus and Antimicrobial 
resistance testing 
 
5.10.3 Where to send specimens for laboratory testing  
The IDSR focal persons at each level of the health system should maintain an 
updated list of the laboratories that have the capacity to perform the required 
laboratory testing and widely circulate it to all health care facility staff 
(Annexes 6 & 7).  The transport mechanism must be clear and supported for 
sending samples from the peripheral level to the district and then the 
provincial/regional and central levels. Similarly, the process for sending the 
feedback to health centre, district and region/province has to be clearly 
defined and supported. 
   5.10.4 Transportation of infectious material 
Packaging and shipping of infectious material must follow the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA) guidelines. According to IATA, diagnostic 
material is any human or animal material including, but not limited to, 
excreta, secreta, blood and its components, tissue fluids being shipped for the 
purpose of diagnosis, excluding live infected animals. 
Triple packaging of infectious material is required. This includes the primary 
container with the specimen (e.g. freeze dried/slab culture) is packed into a 
water tight, leak proof container surrounded with absorbent material around. 
The secondary container should also be water tight and leak proof. This 
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should contain labels that are UN approved. The sender is responsible for: 
arranging with receiver and carrier, and notifying receiver. The carrier is 
responsible for preparing shipping documentation, and notifying the sender 
about packaging and transportation route, delays (e.g. in custom) and eventual 
receipt. The receiver is responsible for obtaining import papers, 
acknowledging receipt to sender. 
Triple Packaging Requirements: 
Primary container: The primary packaging which contains the specimen 
must be watertight.  Example: Vacutainer with adhesive tape around screw 
cap. Use screw-cap conical test tubes or cryovials.  Do not use Eppendorf 
tubes, with tape or parafilm around cap. 
 
Secondary Container: The secondary packaging may contain several 
primary containers.  The secondary packaging must also be watertight.  
Examples of watertight secondary containers include Ziplock plastic bags, a 
conical 50ml test tube, and screw-cap containers.  Absorbent material: must 
be placed between the primary and secondary container. The quantity should 
be sufficient to absorb all liquid in the shipment. Examples would include 
paper towels, cotton balls, filter paper, etc.   
 
If dry ice is needed to keep samples frozen, it should be put between the 
secondary and tertiary packaging.  Styrofoam and cardboard both allow dry 
ice vapor to escape, so dry ice must be placed only OUTSIDE the secondary 
packaging.  Packaging dry ice inside impermeable, screw cap containers may 
cause your shipment to explode. 
Outer Shipping Container:  The tertiary packaging (outside) must protect 
the inside packaging to avoid breakage or perforation under normal transport 
conditions.   Corrugated cardboard is the usual choice. Remember that 
Styrofoam boxes, plastic bags, or paper envelopes are unacceptable outer 
containers for shipping biological materials. 
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Figure 3: Triple Packaging System 
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5.11 Standard operating procedures  
To ensure consistency in performing laboratory activities, it is essential to 
develop and make available standard operating procedures (SOP) for the 
different laboratories at all levels. Their use should be mandatory by all 
laboratory staff members every time they perform an activity. In addition, 
accreditation and licensing procedures should require compulsory use of SOP 
to ensure quality. The NPHL and the technical advisory committee will be 
responsible for the development of SOPs while MoH will monitor the process. 
5.12 Bio-safety and bio-security 
There is a risk of laboratory-acquired infections for those working with 
infectious microbiological agents. It is, therefore, essential that laboratory 
personnel are aware of potential hazards. They must be trained and proficient 
in the practices and techniques of handling such materials safely. Bio-safety 
or operations manuals that identify the hazards that will or may be 
encountered, and that specifies practices and procedures designed to minimize 
or eliminate exposures must be adopted and made available. 
 
Laboratory personnel safety practices and techniques must be supplemented 
by recommended immunizations (Hepatitis B virus, yellow fever and so on), 
and appropriate facility design and features, safety equipment, and 
management practices. Safety equipment includes biological safety cabinets 
(BSCs), a device used to provide containment of infectious splashes or 
aerosols. One important primary barrier is the centrifuge cap, an enclosed 
container designed to prevent aerosols from being released during 
centrifugation. Also to be provided are items for personal protection, such as 
gloves, coats, gowns, shoe covers, boots, masks, respirators, face shields, 
safety glasses, or goggles. For details regarding relations of laboratory tests to 
bio-safety levels, practices and equipment, please refer to WHO bio-safety 
manual. Further details are also available in the guidelines for transport of 
infectious substances17 18.  
 
                                                 
17 World Health Organization, Geneva 2004. Laboratory bio safety manual.  
18 World Health Organization, Guidelines for safe transport of infectious substances and diagnostic specimens 
WHO/EMC/97.3. http://www.who.int/emc 
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The term “bio-security” refers to the protection of microbial agents from loss, 
theft, diversion or intentional misuse. This is accomplished by limiting access 
to facilities, research materials and information. Laboratory bio-security 
activities should be established with clear and consistent polices and guidance. 
Training and familiarization concerning the objectives and requirements of 
laboratory bio-security activities should be ongoing.  Further details are 
available in the WHO Guideline Laboratory Bio-security Guidance, 
September 2006 available from 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_20
06_6.pdf  
 
5.13 Training of laboratory personnel 
To achieve the NPHLN organizational objectives and deliver quality 
service, laboratories require a workforce equipped with the necessary 
technical and managerial skills. Therefore, training and development of 
laboratory personnel is indispensable in improving the quality of laboratory 
services.  
 
As new technologies are introduced constantly, new pathogens recognized, 
and information about known pathogens expanded, NPHLs should have the 
capacity to assist personnel to acquire and maintain new and existing skills 
and knowledge. This will enable them to perform their duties optimally, 
develop their leadership skills and remain motivated as valuable members of 
the public health workforce.  
 
National Public Health Laboratories should support human resource 
development by: 
• Establishing clear statements of the work required and standards to 
be met, for laboratorians in each organizational level  
• Providing or facilitating training courses and workshops for 
laboratory staff   
• Providing access to continuing education in management and 
leadership for those charged with administrative roles  
• Facilitating access to information on new technologies and 
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technology transfer.  
• Promoting the training and retention of higher cadre laboratory 
scientists in the personnel services schemes. 
• Establishment or revisions of the national laboratory policy to accord 
PHL appropriate parity of leadership and clear link with the MoH 
and epidemiologists 
 
The national laboratory training plan should include managerial and inter-
laboratory meetings, national bench training and attachments to reference 
laboratories. The NPHL Network could also benefit from the inter-country 
and regional meetings co-organised by WHO and partners. 
5.13.1 Target groups for training 
The National Public Health Laboratory Network should have a systematic 
and regular method of assessing training needs and skills development of 
staff. The aim of the training needs assessment should be to:  
• Identify the skills and levels of proficiency required for specific 
laboratory activities at each level of the network  
• Determine the current level of proficiency;  
• Assess the gap (i.e., the skills deficiency) between these two criteria 
and thus determine the training needs.  
 
This process requires systematically reviewing the need for improving 
performance of the laboratory workforce, utilizing such methods as 
performance outcome data; performance management review; individual 
employee issues and concerns regarding development; and changes in 
mission, functions, or processes. In addition, feedback from Q& A programs 
should also inform training needs. 
5.13.2 Training approaches 
Pre-service laboratory training 
Laboratory training may be the responsibility of the designated laboratory 
training institutions or universities at national level. The NPHL may support 
the pre-service training through participating in the teaching and taking part 
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in development of curriculum and training materials. Training should 
include not only laboratory topics but also skills and knowledge for public 
health surveillance and epidemiology. 
In-service laboratory training 
The NPHL should regularly conduct short-term courses, workshops and 
refresher training for laboratory personnel. Once training needs are assessed 
and gaps identified, appropriate training approaches should be selected. 
Consideration must be given to availability of funds and level of expertise of 
individuals providing the training. Whenever appropriate, consultation with 
training experts at local level and in collaboration with WHO and partners 
will provide more opportunities for guiding relevant training program. The 
emphasis of a training activity should be on demonstrable skills and should 
focus on measurable competencies. Competency-based or skills-based 
training for public health laboratory professionals should preferably use 
adult learning methods. 
 
Depending on the cost, content, and the instructional expertise required, 
managers should use various innovative training methods such as on-the-job 
training, classroom work, bench training, WHO/partner-supported training, 
and distance learning activities including video conferences, computer-
based training, internet and video/audio tapes. 
 
National workshops for staff of health care facilities involved in collecting, 
storing and transporting specimens to the laboratory should be held at the 
National Laboratory in collaboration with Disease Surveillance Officers and 
other health personnel. 
 Attachments to reference laboratories 
Laboratory personnel, microbiologists or technologists from the National 
Public Health Laboratory may be selected to undergo training in new 
techniques or re-training in basic techniques as required at the Regional 
Reference Laboratory or other WHO collaborating centre. Such training 
programmes could be arranged by the NPHL using its own contacts or 
through WHO or other partner agencies. 
 34 
5.14 Supervision  
Supportive supervisory visits are essential for effective follow-up of trained 
personnel and on-the-job performance of the staff. This will enhance the 
improvement of performance in a given area. Supportive supervision also 
contributes significantly to an employee's application of new skills and 
principles. Most skill-based performance problems are correctable with 
appropriate training, improved on-the-job communications, and mentoring. 
When participants are not able to apply new skills and information, they can 
become demoralized, and training can lose its credibility.  
 
Regular supervision should be conducted in accordance with the structure of 
the NPHLN with district laboratories being in charge of supervision of 
health centres in their catchments area. Appropriate logistic support 
including transport and other necessary tools should be made available to 
facilitate regular supervision at all levels and at different stages of 
development. For example laboratories for new testing sites may require 
more frequent supervision during establishment and capacity development 
phase. Determination of the level of performance should be based on 
observation and documentation using a checklist applicable for the different 
levels of laboratories. 
5.15 Feedback 
Following completion of supervision visits, feedback should be in the form 
of a written report or an on-site discussion as appropriate. In addition, the 
laboratory staff may be called to attend refresher training, or other corrective 
action whenever necessary. 
 
Another forum for feedback is through sharing of information on laboratory 
and personnel performance at monthly district meetings. It is also essential 
to support and encourage the regular publication and wide distribution of 
epidemiological bulletins to enhance performance and share experience 
between the laboratories. 
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5.16 Laboratory resource requirements  
5.16.1 Physical structure 
The construction of laboratory facilities requires standard designs that 
facilitate function, protect laboratory workers and provide barriers to ensure 
the safety of people outside the laboratory. The laboratory management is 
responsible for ensuring that facilities are built and maintained with 
appropriate standards commensurate with the laboratory's function and the 
recommended bio-safety measures.  
5.16.2 Equipment requirement for network laboratories  
The NPHLN should adopt a list of minimum laboratory equipment for the 
different levels. A minimum recommended list that could be adapted to 
local situations is presented in Annex 8.  A list of supplies for laboratory 
participation in outbreak investigations is provided in Annex 9. Laboratory 
equipment should be assessed on a regular basis to ensure maintenance, 
availability, and quality. 
 
Countries are encouraged to mobilize resources to adequately support 
laboratory capacity for confirmation of causative agents of priority 
infectious diseases. This ensures the ability to deal with emergencies and to 
deliver quality surveillance activities. The WHO/AFRO will support the 
procurement of reagents for network laboratories, from established WHO 
accredited laboratories for confirmation of epidemic-causing infectious 
diseases and for External Quality Assessment (EQA) scheme.  
 
Funds should be sourced for needed essential reagents and supplies 
identified for surveillance of diarrhoeal diseases, bacterial meningitis, 
plague and other essential laboratory-based surveillance activities. The 
requirements of each laboratory will vary according to its level and related 
activities. The head of national laboratory services at the MoH will submit 
annually laboratory needs (at all levels), including the required budget for 
training, maintenance, replacement of laboratory equipment, reagents, and 
media. 
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5.16.3 Human resources  
The projections for manpower should ensure that the different 
categories of laboratory staff are produced in adequate numbers to fill 
vacant positions and to provide for attrition of staff, retirement, and potential 
for future expansion. 
 
The following should be considered when projecting future needs for 
laboratory staffing: 
 
 The total number of laboratories; 
 Staffing patterns in existing laboratories; 
 Workload 
 Future developments and expansion of laboratories; and 
 Loss due to retirement or other reasons 
 
It is also essential to ensure development of appropriate cadres of service 
providers and distribute them according to workload as well as geographical 
access and equity.19 Using the method proposed in reference 19, Table 3 
gives an example of staff requirements for average sized laboratories. 
 
Table 3: Types and number of personnel by levels 
 
Level of laboratory Types and number of personnel 
District 3 Laboratory technicians 
Provincial /Regional 
5 Laboratory technicians 
2 Technologists* 
2 Microbiologists 
Central level 
10 Laboratory technicians 
4 Technologists 
3 Microbiologists 
Reference level 
15 Laboratory technicians 
5 Technologists 
5 Microbiologists 
                                                 
19
 World Health Organization Regional Publication, South-East Asia Series No.24, 2nd Edition, 1999 (ISBN 92  9022  
1674) 
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5.17 Quality assurance including quality control 
The NPHLN member laboratories should participate in a national external 
quality assurance and control programme (EQAP). The NPHL should be 
responsible for running and supporting the EQAP; overseeing the reliability, 
reproducibility, and relevance of results from the public health laboratories 
at all levels of the health system. The NPHL should:  
• Adopt norms, standards and indicators to measure performance,  
• Supervise the implementation of quality systems (including quality 
assurance programs, auditing and monitoring) or working in 
partnership with the agency that has this responsibility,  
• Evaluate results, and provide feedback and support to participant 
laboratories,  
• Participate in international quality assurance schemes where feasible 
and relevant and   
• Prepare an annual report on the performance of the laboratories 
grading them accordingly with recommendations to improve quality. 
5.18 Laboratory data management, information sharing, and 
communication  
Modern information and communication technologies have the potential to 
significantly improve data-sharing even in the most remote areas of 
developing countries. Such technologies should be available to NPHL 
network member laboratories and each should have access to personal 
computers and its own institutional E-mail account. This will go a long way 
in enhancing epidemic alert and response by: 
• Capturing and analyzing essential laboratory data; maintaining and 
sharing the data in standardized formats  
• Developing regular exchanges of information and surveillance data 
with other laboratories within the country and other countries  
• Supporting a national network capable of receipt, storage, retrieval 
and analysis of laboratory surveillance data.  
• Facilitating regular reporting of laboratory-confirmed notifiable 
diseases  
• Enabling timely flow of information between different levels and 
different professional groups within the health system  
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• Having established means to communicate rapidly with national 
authorities in relation to potential public health emergencies  
• Providing collated data to inform policy and decision-making 
authorities 
5.18.1 Laboratory data within the network 
All participating laboratories should maintain standard records with date of 
specimen receipt, patient/case information, specimen condition, test result 
and date when results were reported out. (Please see Annex 10 for a sample 
specimen transmittal and reporting form). A system of immediate and 
regular reporting of district laboratory information to the provincial and to 
the national levels would be expected. 
 
The NPHLN has to be open to epidemiologists and should have access to 
the laboratory database for public health use. There should be two types of 
reporting to the national epidemiologists, immediate and routine. Immediate 
reports should go directly to the unit in charge of action. In general, a 
positive culture for Vibrio cholerae, Neisseria meningtidis, Shigella  
dysenteriae type 1 or Yersinia pestis) should be reported immediately to the 
district and the national epidemiologists.  For routine reporting of laboratory 
data to the national epidemiologists (including positive, negative and 
pending results), a database with all specimens year-to date should be shared 
every month to the national level. 
5.18.2 Sharing of data with WHO  
The NPHL should share selected laboratory data with the WHO. This could 
be done immediately, weekly or monthly as part of the routine reporting 
system. An immediate notification should be made by E-mail for diseases, 
conditions or events described in the International Health regulation (IHR) 
or other previously agreed-on reporting requirements20 such as a positive 
serology for plague, positive culture of Shigella dysenteriae type 1, V.  
cholerae, N. meningitidis, or Y.  pestis.  
 
                                                 
20
 World Health Organization, Geneva 2006. International Health Regulations (2005) http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/en/ 
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Regarding routine reporting, a database of laboratory results should be 
shared with WHO weekly and monthly. Experiences and lessons learned 
from the WHO polio laboratory network shows that sharing data with WHO 
is very important as it allows WHO to: 
• Participate in the quality assurance process,  
• advocate for more funds for laboratory strengthening  
• Provide feedback to funding partners on the impact of the 
contribution of partners,  
• Identify areas where case detection and specimen collection are 
inadequate to take corrective measures 
• Identify locations of outbreaks to alert neighbouring countries,  
• Respond to outbreaks, and  
• Mobilize resources for outbreak response and outbreak prevention. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Screen shot from WHO/AFRO bacteriology database 
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5.19 Network communications                                                    
5.19.1 What information should be communicated 
Regular and informal information may be shared in the network. Regular 
reports provide disease-specific information requested as part of the 
reporting requirements of the network. Initial efforts should aim at providing 
data for high priority epidemic-prone bacterial diseases. These diseases 
include cholera, dysentery, meningococcal meningitis, and plague. As 
network activities mature, other etiologic agents should be included in the 
report. Additional information may be shared at any time with any or all of 
the network members at the discretion of each reporting authority. 
5.19.2 To whom should the laboratory communicate 
Regular monthly communications within a country should be organized by 
the NPHL. NPHLs should communicate directly with the WHO Country 
Office and through them to the WHO Inter-Country Support Team (IST). 
Each Inter-country Team will compile the reports from all Member States in 
their sub-region and will communicate with the point of contact at the WHO 
Regional Office for Africa. National (internal) networks are encouraged to 
establish their own reporting framework that best suits their situations. 
Informal communication may be directed to any or all of the network 
members at any time. 
 5.19.3 How often should the network communicate 
Reports from the laboratories in the network should be submitted monthly, 
arriving at the national level no later than the 10th day of the month. 
Summary information should be for the previous month or for the preceding 
period for which information is available. 
 
5.19.4 What methods should be used 
All national level laboratories should have their own computer and email for 
communication. Other laboratories in the network should communicate 
using the most rapid and reliable means available to them, which may 
include email, fax, telephone, radio and surface mail.  
 41 
5.20  Laboratory functions related to IHR (2005) 
The nature of International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005 implies that 
laboratory work should be carried out according to internationally 
recognized quality standards, in order to rely on trusted data. Every member 
state should be able to provide reliable and timely laboratory identification 
of infectious agents likely to cause public health emergencies of 
international concern. This will help to minimize international traffic of 
specimens and preserve national sovereignty. 
  
As very few countries have a comprehensive laboratory capacity, the 
organization of laboratory diagnostics should be based on a reliable sample 
collection and transport system, domestic diagnostic capacity for the priority 
events and the use of outside capacity when needed. Each member state 
should determine the structure of their laboratory capacity system and assess 
its proficiency in order to reach the requirements mentioned for IHR.21 
(Annex 12) 
5.21 Resource mobilization and coordination of partners  
Funds for the development and continuity of laboratory services will be 
derived from both the governments’ and partners’ support and collaboration.  
 
 
                                                 
21
 Core capacity requirements for surveillance and response-  IHR 
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA58/WHA58_3-en.pdf 
 
 42 
 6. Steps for establishing an NPHL network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Prepare to assess existing national laboratory system 
Establish a working group 
The process of establishing a viable NPHLN requires a systematic approach 
and demanding preparation by concerned national authorities and other 
stakeholders.  The process starts with establishment of a working group 
(technical committee) to coordinate and oversee the establishment of the 
NPHL network. The working group should comprise five to seven members 
and should be designated by the appropriate authority of the MoH.  
Ideally, it should include but not limited to:  
• Director or chief officer in charge of the laboratories at the 
ministry of health , 
• Chief epidemiologist in the ministry of health, 
• A representative from private or non-governmental laboratories 
and,  
• A representative of one of the university laboratories (medical 
school or the teaching hospital) and   
• A representative of the regional/provincial reference laboratories, 
and  
• Stakeholders in disease specific programs, funding partners and 
so on. 
 
Steps for establishing and implementing NPHL Network 
 
1. Prepare to assess existing national laboratory system 
2. Assess and describe the current practices and identify gaps 
3. Define the desired future NPHL network  
4. Develop national strategic plan to implement NPHL network   
5. Get the national strategic plan & Policy approved 
6. Launch the NPHL Network and implement the approved plan 
7. Monitor, evaluate and improve implementation.  
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This working group should provide leadership in defining the desired future 
NPHLN, the assessment and preparation of current conditions, practices and 
needs, and preparation of multi-year plan for strengthening the NPHLN.  
Develop a plan to assess the existing national laboratory network  
The working group should develop/adapt a plan with detailed timetable, tool 
and logistics requirement for the assessment and eventually establishment of 
the network. The working group should also accomplish the following.   
 
• Identify and agree on the tasks for completing each of the steps,  
• Identify the responsibilities and tasks of each group member, and  
• Set timetables for completing the tasks. 
• Prepare /adapt the generic WHO assessment tools  
• Identify resources (human, finance and material) 
6.2 Assess and describe the current practices and identify gaps  
In this step, the working group develops a thorough description of the 
current practices and functions of the laboratory system.  The assessment 
should address laboratory infrastructure, equipment, staffing profile, type of 
tests performed at each level, quality assurance systems, reporting, 
supervision and sources of funding.  Efforts spent in documenting these 
practices, included what worked well or not well in each of the assessment 
domains will ensure a systematic approach to improving gap areas and 
building a solid foundation for a national public health laboratory network.  
WHO has prepared a generic assessment tool offering suggestions that may 
help the working describe current practices and infrastructure so that priority 
actions can be identified.22  
6.3 Define the desired future NPHL network  
Define the vision and overall direction of the NPHLN in the country.  The 
vision should build on what is working and rectify what is not working 
within the means that are affordable for the country. It is important to 
                                                 
22
 World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa.  Protocol for assessment of national communicable 
disease surveillance and epidemic preparedness and response systems (February 2000).  AFR/IDS/01.1 
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involve all stakeholders in defining the vision, goals, scope, objectives and 
strategies of the NPHLN.  
6.4 Develop national strategic plan to implement NPHL network    
Determine priorities for strengthening NPHL Network system and develop 
vision, goals, objectives, expected results and strategies to achieve the 
desired results. Prepare a detailed budget that forecasts funding needed each 
year for at least the first 3 years. Using the available resources and partners’ 
support finalise the policy and plan with assigned budget and time frame. 
6.5 Obtain approval for the plan from MoH officials 
The working group should present the finalised strategic plan to the MoH 
policy makers and planning authorities for approval. If approved this plan 
should be incorporated in the health sector plan. Launch the NPHL Network 
and implement the plan 
6.6 Launch NPHLN and implement plan 
Following the approval of the strategic plan, obtaining essential resources 
and preparation of the operational guide or a well formulated constitution 
for establishing a laboratory network, a formational meeting should be 
organised. This meeting should be attended by all “would be" member 
laboratories, surveillance officers and representatives of local, bilateral and 
international partners. The meeting can serve as an impetus to kick-start the 
long but doable journey of forming and maintaining a viable NPHLN.  
6.7 Monitor, evaluate and improve implementation 
The implementation of the plan should be monitored to track if the planned 
activities are indeed being implemented. The National IDSR program 
should participate in the monitoring process and should support in finding 
solutions to some of the outstanding issues including helping in mobilization 
of resources for supporting critical and strategic activities of the network. 
 
Regular tracking of implementation should be supplemented with a periodic 
assessment of the overall effectiveness and outcome/impact of the NPHLN 
using appropriate laboratory indicators. The generic laboratory indicators 
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developed by WHO in close collaboration with technical partners (CDC –
USA) could be adapted to the national context and applied and selected by 
Member States. (Annex 11). 
 
7. Linkage of NPHLN with WHO regional and sub-regional PHL Network 
Network formation beyond the national level will assist member states in a 
variety of ways and facilitate the timely and effective use of information and 
sharing of technical, material and financial resources to strengthen 
laboratory capacity. The recent trend of African laboratories liaising with 
laboratories in the West including development of work plans and creating 
linkages for shared activities is timely for enhancing surveillance to detect 
and respond to the increased threat of global epidemics. 
7.1  WHO actions to strengthen NPHL Network 
The first priority for the WHO Regional Office is to support establishment 
of a National Public Health Laboratory in all Member States of the WHO 
African Region to ensure successful implementation of IDSR and 
International Health Regulations (IHR-2005).  
 
The establishment of an NPHLN could be a phased approach beginning with 
a few laboratories equipped with appropriately trained staff, essential 
equipment and maintenance facilities and reliable supply of reagents. These 
laboratories could be supported to be part of the regional external quality 
assurance and control program and provisions could be made for laboratory-
based data management.  With experience and availability of more 
resources, the network could be expanded to the provincial and district 
reference laboratories as well as private laboratories. 
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7.2  WHO regional and sub-regional PHL Network  
The WHO Regional Laboratory Coordinator and WHO inter-country 
laboratory experts will provide technical support to ensure proper 
functioning of the NPHLN. The Regional Office will also encourage and 
promote appropriate and effective use of laboratories to support 
implementation of the national integrated disease surveillance and response 
activities. In addition, the Regional Office will also deploy short term 
consultants and experts to support the NPHLs selected as sub-regional and 
regional laboratory networks.  
Regional reference laboratories 
There is at least one regional reference laboratory in each epidemiological 
block. These laboratories are able to diagnose rare pathogens referred by 
national and sub-regional reference laboratories. The functions of these 
laboratories are to:  
• Confirm results of national and sub-regional referral laboratories, 
when necessary 
• Establish a strain bank of unusual organisms 
• Conduct molecular and genetic characterization of isolates 
• Refer selected isolates to international collaborating laboratories 
• Prepare and distribute to sub-regional referral laboratories,  non-
commercial reference and diagnostic reagents 
• Train staff of national and sub-regional referral laboratories 
• Perform quality control and monitoring of performance standards of 
national laboratories via sub-regional referral laboratories and 
through the management of proficiency tests. 
• Monitor anti-microbial resistance of targeted diseases 
Sub-regional reference laboratories  
There are at least two sub-regional reference laboratories in each of the three 
WHO sub-regions which are duly supported by the inter-country laboratory 
expert. The selection was made after assessment by the regional and inter-
country laboratory experts. The functions of these sub-regional laboratories 
are to: 
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• Confirm results of national laboratories, when necessary 
• Train staff of national laboratories at sub-regional level of the bloc 
• Support national laboratories in terms of equipment and reagents and 
assist in case of outbreak confirmation 
• Collaborate with the Regional Reference Laboratory in the regional 
EQC/QA scheme designed for NPHL  
• Support developing national EQA schemes and participate in 
corrective actions based on the results of the regional EQA program. 
7.3 Coordination of WHO/AFRO laboratory networks 
WHO/AFRO maintains a network of national reference laboratories through 
the sub-regional and regional reference laboratories for bacteriology (Vibrio 
cholerae, Shigella dysenteriae type 1, Neisseria meningitis, Streptococcus 
pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae b, and Yersinia pestis for plague 
endemic countries only). The WHO bacteriology laboratory network has 
mechanisms for quality assessment and laboratory data recording and 
reporting. The network members have agreed to participate in the EQA as 
well as in regularly submitting laboratory specimens to the network. The 
network would follow the WHO polio network model. 
Managerial meetings 
Directors of Referral Regional and Sub-Regional Laboratories and NPHNL 
should participate in the joint laboratory and epidemiologists meetings at 
regional and sub-regional levels. The laboratory directors should share their 
experiences, problems and achievements and discuss with program 
managers the implementation of regional, sub-regional and national work 
plans. Similar meetings should be held regularly at the national level. In 
addition, every year a regional meeting will be organised for the directors of 
all NPHLs to discuss strategic issues and make recommendations to chart 
the way forward. 
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Technical workshops 
Professional staff of Regional and Sub-Regional Reference Laboratories 
should attend all WHO workshops organized for training in advanced 
techniques. Depending on the availability of resources, training courses on 
WHO recommended diagnostic methods for targeted diseases should be 
held at Regional Reference Laboratory for staff that requires additional 
training. 
 
National workshops for health care facility staff involved in collecting, 
storing and transporting specimens to reference laboratories should be held 
at the NPHL in collaboration with the national epidemiological surveillance 
unit of the MoH.  
Attachments to reference laboratories 
Microbiologists or Technologists from Regional, Sub-Regional Referral 
Laboratories or National Laboratories may be required to undergo training 
in new techniques or re-training in basic techniques as recommended by 
WHO consultants. 
 Remedial training 
Should proficiency test results or analysis of reported laboratory data reveal 
sub-standard performance by staff at a network laboratory of any level, a 
consultant may be assigned to investigate the source of the problem and 
propose solutions including conducting training, as appropriate. 
7.4 Antimicrobial resistance network 
The laboratories in the African region with already established research 
activities on anti-microbial resistance will be reference laboratories for the 
network. Anti-microbial testing for V. cholerae, S. dysenteriae type 1, and 
N. meningitdis, including bacterial pathogens causing STDs and 
opportunistic infections in patients with HIV/AIDS is already being done by 
some national laboratories. Therefore, Regional and Sub-regional Reference 
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Laboratories for anti-microbial resistance will coordinate data collection and 
further advanced testing of isolates of these three pathogens.  
 
For other organisms (Neisseria gonorrhoeae and opportunistic bacteria such 
as Salmonella, Escherichia coli, Pseudomonas, and Staphylococcus), the 
reference laboratories will conduct anti-microbial resistance monitoring and 
possibly work with other network laboratories to extend the monitoring. 
 
WHO/AFRO will continue to organize training of personnel from NPHL 
and/or referral laboratories in order to standardize AMR susceptibility 
testing. WHO/AFRO will also provide national reference laboratories with 
reference strains to allow them to perform QC for their AMR testing.  
 
At WHO/AFRO, staff of the sub-regional and regional network form part of 
the global laboratory network that includes collaborating centres at the 
international level. The collaborating centres are the designated reference 
centres for specific diseases such as meningococcal meningitis, influenza, 
Ebola or Marburg disease. These collaborating centres will provide 
technical and material support to laboratories at the regional, sub-regional 
and country levels. Each country’s NPHL is the focal point for contacts with 
the collaborating centres.  
 
8. Monitoring and evaluation  
Laboratory performance and staff competence, as well as activities in 
relation to enhancement of disease surveillance and control, will be 
monitored regularly through the use of standard performance indicators, 
proficiency panel testing, on spot assessment, and discussion with 
surveillance and health officials. EQA will regularly be used at all NPHLs 
by Regional and Sub-Regional Reference laboratories. The core laboratory 
indicators will be used to measure the progress. In addition, evaluation of 
laboratory performance is encouraged each time an epidemic occurs in the 
respective service area.   Please Annex 11 for a list of the IDSR Core 
Laboratory Indicators. 
 
 50 
  
9.0 References 
 
1. World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa. Integrated Disease 
Surveillance in the African Region, a regional strategy for communicable diseases 
1999-2003.  
2. World Health Organization, Regional office for Africa, Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention. Technical Guidelines for IDSR in the African Region, Atlanta, 
Georgia. Public Health Service, Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention/Epidemiology Program Office, Division of International Health; 
National Centre for Infectious Diseases, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic 
Diseases. July 2001:10-11. Detect and respond to priority diseases,    
(http://www.cdc.gov/idsr/IDSR_resources/detection/detect_respond_eng.pdf) 
3. World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa. Regional Committee 
Resolution AFR/RC 48 /R2, 1998 
4. World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa. Documentation of IDSR 
implementation in the WHO African Region: Summary of the Synthesis Report . 
CDER, May 2003 
5. Perry HP, McDonnell SM, Alemu W, Nsubuga P, Chungong S, Otten MW Jr, 
Lusamba-dikassa P and Thacker SB.  Planning an integrated disease surveillance 
and response system: a matrix of skills and activities.  BMC Medicine 2007, 5:24 
available from http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/5/24 
6. McNabb S JN, Chungong S, Ryan M, Wuhib T, Nsubuga P, Alemu W,  
Carandekulis V and Rodier G. Conceptual framework of public health surveillance 
and action and its implication in health sector reform. BMC Public Health 2002, 2:2 
7. World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa. Regional Committee 
Resolution AFR/RC 43 /R7, 1993 
8. Bates I and Maitland K. Are laboratory services coming of age in Sub-Saharan 
Africa?  Editorial Commentary. CID 2006:42(1February) 383-384 
9. Martin R, Hearn T, Ridderhof, J. and Demby A. Implementation of a quality 
systems approach for laboratory practice in resource-constrained countries.  AIDS 
2005, 19(suppl 2):S59-S65 
10. World Health Organization. Strengthening surveillance and response for epidemic-
prone and vaccine-preventable diseases in selected African and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries 2005 (WHO/CDS/CSR/LYO/2005.23) 
 51 
11. The Global Polio Laboratory Network: A Model for Good Laboratory Practice 
http://www.qaproject.org/pubs/pubstechreports.html#globalpolionetwork 
 
12. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention-USA. IDS Update Bulletin. IDSR links 
with other surveillance programs. Update Bulletin, Vol 2, Fall 2001 
13. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention-USA. IDS Update Bulletin. 
Documentation of IDSR implementation in the African & Eastern Mediterranean 
Regions. Update Bulletin, issue 4 , 2003 
14. World Health Organization Country office in collaboration with Great Lakes 
Epidemiologic Bloc. IDS/Health Information Bulletin Integrated Disease 
Surveillance & Response 
www.cdc.gov/idsr/files/CSR_Bulletin_Dec_02_Volume_7/CSR_Bulletin_Dec_02_
Volume_7.htm#lab 
15. World Health Organization, Laboratory Support to Emerging Diseases. World 
Health Organization Regional Office for South-East Asia New Delhi, 
www.whoindia.org/LinkFiles/Public_Health_Laboratory_Networking_SEARO_rec
ommendations_on_networking_of_PHL.pdf 
16. World Health Organization, Regional Office for Africa and Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention. Technical Guideline for Integrated Disease Surveillance 
and Response in the African Region, May 2002 
17. World Health Organization, Geneva 2004.  Laboratory bio safety manual.  
 http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/Biosafety7.pdf. 
18.  World Health Organization, Guidelines for safe transport of infectious  
      substances and diagnostic specimens.  WHO/EMC/97.3.   
      http://libdoc.who.int/hq/1997/WHO_EMC_97.3.pdf 
19. World Health Organization Regional Publication, South-East Asia Series No.24, 2nd  
           Edition, 1999 (ISBN 92  9022  1674) 
20. World Health Organization, Geneva 2006. International Health Regulations (2005) 
http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/en/  
21. Core capacity requirements for surveillance and response-  IHR 
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA58/WHA58_3-en.pdf 
22. World Health Organization, Protocol for assessment of national communicable 
disease surveillance and epidemic preparedness and response systems (Feb 2000 
Version). WHO Regional Office for Africa, AFR/IDS/01.1 
 52 
10. Annexes 
 Annex 1: Terms of reference for NPHLN  
Annex 2: Terms of reference for an IDSR Laboratory Technical Committee 
(Working group)  
Annex 3: Terms of reference for the laboratory focal person 
Annex 4:  Public health laboratory network functions 
Annex 5 WHO/AFRO IDSR priority diseases  
Annex 6: Core bacteriology laboratory tests for IDSR in an outbreak  
Annex 7: Laboratory line list of bacteriological specimen & pathogens isolated 
for surveillance 
Annex 8: Recommended laboratory equipment for each level 
Annex 9: Recommended supplies for outbreak investigation 
Annex 10: Sample form for reporting laboratory results 
Annex 11: Proposed laboratory indicators for monitoring and evaluating the 
implementation of a laboratory network 
Annex 12: Requirements of the national laboratories in the context of IHR – 
core capacity checklist 
Annex 13: Specimens for laboratory confirmation for priority diseases at the 
district level 
 
 
 
 
 53 
 
Annex 1: Terms of  Reference for a National Public Health Laboratory 
Network 
 
1. Establish, maintain and expand collaborative links between laboratories (including 
veterinary laboratories) that have functions related to public health impact at the 
various levels in the country. 
 
2. Promote best practices in all disciplines of public health laboratory services 
including setting standards, establishing and promoting internal and external quality 
assurance mechanisms. 
 
3. Improve nationwide access to quality public health laboratory services for 
confirmation and characterization of causative agents for effective control of 
communicable diseases. 
 
4. Work collaboratively with the national IDSR focal person/team, WHO and partners 
to ensure optimal use of public health laboratory resources for communicable 
diseases surveillance including outbreak investigations. 
 
5. Build on existing laboratory capacity to respond to existing and newly emerging 
infectious diseases. 
 
6. Respond to matters relating to public health microbiology including resistance 
monitoring, as referred by national programs. 
 
7. Accreditation of laboratories at national level. 
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference for the National Public Health Laboratory 
Technical Committee (working group) in Uganda 
 
This is an example of the terms of reference develop for a national public health laboratory 
working group formed in Uganda and reflects the Ugandan national priorities and context. 
 
Mandate 
 
The Laboratory Technical Committee (LTC), on behalf of the Ministry of Health, will 
provide technical and professional guidance and support in all aspects of laboratory work to 
institutions and organizations, both government and non-governmental, working in the 
health and allied sectors for effective and efficient performance of health laboratory 
services. 
 
Terms of reference 
 
House-Keeping: 
Propose ‘Terms of Reference’ (TOR) for the LTC to the Ministry of Health (MOH) for 
endorsement by the Director General of Health Services (DGHS); review annually and 
modify TOR periodically in response to changing needs and new developments. 
 
Propose terms and conditions for the operation of the LTC including; number of members 
(21), their period of service (3 years) and rules for replacement for non-performance (non-
attendance at 4 consecutive meetings), ministries, organizations, institutions and NGOs to 
have representation on the Committee, appointment of officers to specific positions (Chair-
Person, Secretary and their deputies) and their rotation, minimum number of members 
necessary to conduct business (quorum of 7), standing sub-committees, ad hoc committees 
and task forces and their officers, frequency and location of regular meetings and annual 
review meeting. 
 
Establish lines of reporting to relevant divisions within the MOH, currently Epidemiology 
and Surveillance, National Disease Control and the Division of Community and Clinical 
Services. 
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Identify potential funding sources for LTC Secretariat and for travel reimbursement for 
meeting attendance of members. 
 
Central Level Activities: 
Advocate for structural changes within the MOH to establish a Health Laboratory Services 
Division, headed by a senior health laboratory professional with appropriate staffing to 
represent the laboratory sector on the Health Sector Strategic Planning Committee and to 
coordinate rehabilitation and management of the health laboratory services in the country; 
the LTC will report to this Division once it is established. 
 
Develop a consultancy to draft national health laboratory services policy for legislative 
action and a five-year strategic-plan. 
 
Act as a forum for ministries, institutions, donor agencies and NGOs to exchange ideas and 
plans and provide direction and coordination of resources to under-funded activities. 
 
National level activities: 
Working with the Central Public Health Laboratory, set standards for laboratory 
requirements at Health Centre III and IV and district and regional hospitals in terms of; 
Physical infrastructure and equipment maintenance, 
Staffing levels, certification and support supervision, 
Minimal essential diagnostic tests, equipment, Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP) including quality control (QC), commodity stock levels 
and quality assurance (QA), 
Commodities management, 
Infection control, safety and waste disposal policies, 
Networks, 
Laboratory information management system and reporting, 
Laboratory management. 
 
Establish standing sub-committees (LTC members plus co-opted members from relevant 
organizations/institutions) to work with stakeholders and partners to fund and conduct 
needs assessment surveys, design and implement interventions and monitor progress as 
follows; 
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Infrastructure: 
Coordinate donor funding to rehabilitate and develop physical infrastructure and 
provide and maintain essential equipment. 
 
Coordinate the development of new technologies and the evaluation of new 
instruments, diagnostic kits, testing algorithms and protocols and publish findings. 
 
Promote the establishment of networks within districts/regions based on public, 
private and NGO health facilities for effective referral of patients/specimens. 
 
Staffing: 
Advise MOH on appropriate staffing norms at different facility levels; advocate for 
the filling of vacant laboratory staff positions in district health facilities. 
 
Provide support to the Allied Health Professionals Council (AHPC) in the 
regulation of health laboratory services through certification and registration of 
health laboratory professionals and accreditation and performance evaluation of 
health laboratories. 
 
Identify requirements for in-service training of laboratory staff and assist 
institutions and organizations in identifying funding to develop and conduct training 
courses. 
 
Work with donor agencies to develop scholarship programmes to increase the 
numbers of laboratory professionals in the country and provide short training 
courses in laboratory management and other relevant laboratory disciplines. 
 
Source funds to expand capacity at laboratory training schools and university 
medical laboratory departments to include course revisions to strengthen laboratory 
management components. 
 
Liaise and guide the professional laboratory associations in the promotion of 
continuing professional development programmes. 
 
Support supervision: 
Assist partners in identifying funding to strengthen capacity of Regional Laboratory 
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Coordinators (RLC) and District Laboratory Focal Persons (DLFP) to monitor 
laboratory performance including; 
 
Setting of process indicators (to include staff attendance and specimen 
reporting time) and outcome indicators 
Development of performance evaluation tools 
Identification of constraints to improved performance; design and 
implementation of corrective measures and re-evaluation 
Scheduling of regular support supervision visits and reporting 
Establishment of individual health facility laboratory management teams. 
 
Encourage health facilities to assess laboratory performance in the context of the 
overall health facility performance by conducting exit polls and making suggestion 
boxes available. 
 
Work with laboratory professional associations to develop and pilot mechanisms to 
register and evaluate user (general public and health facility staff) complaints 
concerning laboratory performance. 
 
Institute a rewards scheme to recognize outstanding individual and laboratory 
performance. 
 
Establish a joint laboratory monitoring team to evaluate national laboratories 
(CPHL, Nakasero Blood Bank [NBB], Uganda Virus Research Institute [UVRI] 
and the National TB Laboratory [NTBL]) and offer this service to other reference 
and research laboratories. 
 
Plan for regional level support supervision. 
 
Commodities management: 
Set standards for commodities management (stock items, levels, and storage and re-
order thresholds) through a national consensus workshop. 
 
Conduct regular needs assessment surveys to identify shortfalls and, together with 
national (National Medical Stores; NMS) and district authorities, plan and 
implement corrective interventions in the commodities supply chain, to include a 
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distribution system down to the health facility level. 
 
 
Train laboratory managers in commodities management and procurement 
procedures, sensitize laboratory management teams and set progress indicators. 
 
Foster linkages between MOH, WHO, NMS, Joint Medical Stores (JMS), District 
authorities and development partners (USAID, Deliver, AMREF and CDC) to 
monitor progress in laboratory strengthening. 
 
Quality assurance: 
Ensure SOPs, appropriate to each health facility level, are distributed to all health 
facilities offering laboratory services. 
 
Designate, and identify funding to support, a specific HC III, HC IV and District 
Hospital as model facilities within which to develop detailed guidelines for 
integrated quality assurance activities including process and outcome indicators. 
 
Develop a tool to assess each component of a quality assurance scheme, train 
RLC/DLFP in its use and organize a national consensus workshop as part of the 
National Health Laboratory Quality Assurance Scheme.  
 
Assist the HIV Reference and Quality Assurance Laboratory (HRL) at the Uganda 
Virus Research Institute (UVRI) to develop and implement a national quality 
assurance (QA) programme for HIV serological testing to include test kit and 
algorithm evaluation, proficiency testing and quality control (QC) testing. 
 
Identify funding to supplement existing QC activities at NTBL (proficiency testing 
panels and a referral system for QC testing at NTBL) and strengthen the capacity of 
NTBL to perform the functions of a TB reference laboratory. 
 
Assist CPHL in responding to funding opportunities to develop its own laboratory 
space and, to expand and re-define the National Health Laboratory Quality 
Assurance Scheme (NEQAS) as the overall authority for national laboratory QA. 
 
Establish networks within and between districts for referral and QC activities. 
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Strengthen existing medical equipment maintenance units in the country. 
 
Commission a needs assessment survey of current practice in requesting, recording 
and reporting laboratory testing at the different health facility levels; design a 
national laboratory information management system (LIMS); conduct a national 
consensus workshop; implement and monitor progress.   
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Annex 3:  Example: Terms of reference for the laboratory focal point for 
                  epidemic prone diseases (IDSR)  
 
The focus of these terms of reference for the national laboratory focal point for IDSR is on 
four bacterial pathogens.  
 
Background 
 
The IDSR Laboratory Focal Point should be designated by the Ministry of Health 
(preferably Epidemiology/Surveillance Unit). This person should be stationed at the 
National Reference Laboratory for Bacteriology or the National Public Health Laboratory 
and be responsible for coordinating the National Public Health Laboratory Network. In 
addition this person should be a laboratory specialist and have a competency in Public 
Health and he/she should be a member of the national epidemiologic surveillance team as 
well as the national Epidemic Response Team.  
 
This person is expected to be in contact with the following:  
- WHO Sub-regional Laboratories for epidemic prone diseases 
- WHO Regional Reference laboratories for epidemic prone diseases 
- Regional WHO Collaborating Centres.  
He should have at regional and district level a focal person with the same duties. 
 
 
General mission  
 
The functional laboratory networks are an essential component of the WHO-AFRO 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy. The IDSR Laboratory 
Focal Point has the general mission to: 
- Ensure the linkage and the interaction of the public health laboratories and the 
surveillance activities at national and regional levels. 
- Implement precise, appropriate and permanent diagnostic practices  
- Contribute to the collection, the management, treatment and utilization of 
laboratory data for public health interventions 
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Specific mission  
 
Under the responsibility of the head of the laboratory, he/she has a specific mission as 
follows:  
Structure/ organization/ administration/legislation: 
 
- Identify in each level of laboratories (public and private) a focal point for the 
epidemic preparation and response 
- Submit to the authorities an official text for the creation of the National Network 
Laboratories, if it is not yet implemented in that country 
- Define and adopt a coherent circuit of data transmission 
- Organize national meetings with the personnel of the national or public health 
laboratories, periphery laboratories and intermediate laboratories to identify 
needs, to establish consensus and develop working relationships. It will make it 
easier for the implementation of a professional network for continuous and 
sharing information  
- Improve relations and collaboration between laboratory personnel and 
epidemiologists 
- Ensure exchange of experience within the member countries of the WHO 
- Make available a national strain bank for epidemic prone diseases 
- Advocate for government and partners funds to continue the development of  
laboratory activities  
- Follow up the implementation of a maintenance programme for equipment and 
QA/QC. 
 
Registration/notification/analyze/interpretation/report 
- Standardize the method of the data collected in the laboratories  
- Make tools available  for collection (form, register) and transmission of data at 
all levels 
- Organize a regular system for the collection and management of data for the 
laboratories for epidemic prone diseases (Shigella, Vibrio cholerae, bacterial 
meningitis, etc) 
- Send regular monthly reports directly to the national office in charge of 
surveillance and prevention for public health interventions 
- Send regular laboratory reports of data to the WHO/AFRO and the IST/CDS + 
EPR  
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- Analyze the data and feed-back results to the laboratories (province/region and 
district) and to personnel in charge of the  epidemiologic surveillance 
- Make available the reports of epidemic prone pathogens and antimicrobial 
resistance surveillance  
- Send positive results to the district and central epidemiologist unit, according 
to the IDSR guideline  
- Create a data base for all the analyzed specimens (positive, negative or pending 
results) and share monthly with persons concerned in surveillance activities  
 
Laboratory confirmation 
- Adopt standard methods for bacteriologic diagnosis of cholera, bacillary 
dysentery, bacterial meningitis, plague and other priority epidemic prone 
diseases  
- Ensure, manage and maintain an adequate stock of reagents and culture media 
to  supply the network laboratories.  
- Send some specimens or bacterial/ viral strains, if it is necessary, to reference 
sub unit regional laboratories/ reference regional laboratories/ regional 
collaborating centres/ international collaborating centres 
- Assess every year all the laboratories in each level and send the report to the 
regional office 
 
Epidemics preparation and response 
- Ensure good management of essential reagents to help the laboratory to 
investigate epidemics  
- Involve laboratory personnel in all levels of outbreak control activities 
- Develop the partnership / twinning with public national laboratories/ 
specialized institutes/ WHO Collaborating Centres for the epidemic prone 
disease diagnosis 
- Report the epidemic. 
- Monitor and assess the response activated during the outbreaks 
- Advocate for funds for rapid shipping of specimens to reference laboratories/ 
specialized institutes/ WHO Collaborating Centres 
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Training and supervision 
- Organize training workshops for standard technical, material and methods used 
for the diagnosis of cholera, dysentery, bacterial meningitis, plague and other 
priority epidemic prone diseases and also standard methods of antimicrobial 
resistance detection 
- Organize national workshop in collaboration with the heads of epidemic prone 
diseases surveillance, for the personal working in sanitary structure involved in 
collecting, packaging, storing and shipping of the samples  
- Training/refresh training the personal in charge of public health activities in the 
field for the collection, packaging, storage and transportation of the samples and 
also the main steps for laboratories diagnostic 
- Training/ refresh training the laboratory technicians in basic epidemiology and 
data management 
- Encourage laboratory participation in regional external quality control and 
accreditation of reference laboratories program in Vibrio cholerae, Shigella 
dysenteriae, bacterial meningitis, and  Yersinia pestis and other micro-
organisms 
- Organize a national program for quality assurance for the peripheral laboratories 
- Elaborate, adopt and disseminate procedures manual for the laboratory activities 
and bio security 
- Supervise the intermediary and peripheral laboratory technicians  
 
Monitoring and assessment 
- Contribute to the participation of joint meetings with the epidemiologists. The 
IDSR Laboratory Focal Point must share its experience and its daily constraints 
to those responsible for the programs, they must prepare and agree on the 
implementation of the national action plan 
- The National Focal Point in IDSR should maintain good scientific linkages with the 
other laboratories for the specific program and the national institutes for the 
research.  
 
Monitor and assess regularly the laboratories performance, the personal skill and all the 
activities for the surveillance and prevention with those responsible for health services, by 
using the standards indicators IDSR. 
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Annex 4: Laboratory network functions in the diagnosis of priority diseases 
 1.0 Collect 2.0 Confirm 3.0 Report 
Patients,  
Providers  
(Community, Health  
Facilities) 
• Use standardized case definitions to 
determine initiation of collection process  
• Assist First Contact Laboratory in specimen 
collection within approved guidelines  
• Document specimens with patients’ complete 
clinical history and description 
• Transport specimens to First Contact 
Laboratory and Referral Laboratory within 
approved guidelines  
• Use standardized case definitions to 
initiate confirmation process as part of 
an outbreak investigation 
•  Handle specimens within approved 
guidelines  
 
• Record collection of specimens 
 
First Contact Laboratory  
(District, Province) 
• Communicate collection policies and 
procedures to providers 
• Request additional specimen collection by 
laboratory or providers, as needed  
• Store specimens within approved conditions 
pending transport or additional studies 
• Direct additional collection as needed based 
on outbreak investigation 
• Perform laboratory studies for 
presumptive diagnosis as appropriate: 
microscopy, staining, microscopy, RDT  
•  Store representative slides from the 
outbreak as needed 
• Observe changes in trends during routine 
analysis of laboratory results 
• Record laboratory results  
• Provide results to clinical staff and 
patients  
• Report results to local epidemiology 
offices 
• Report observed changes in trends 
during routine analysis of laboratory 
results  
• Use summary information in 
response to out breaks  
Referral  
Laboratory 
(National)  
some laboratories may 
function as First Contact 
and as Referral  
Laboratories 
• Set collection policies and procedures with 
national epidemiology office and national 
reference laboratories  
• Distribute specimen collection kits for special 
surveillance activities 
• Request additional specimen collection by 
laboratory or providers, as needed  
• Store specimens within approved conditions 
pending transport or additional studies 
•  Set confirmation policies and 
procedures with national epidemiology 
office and national reference laboratories  
• Perform laboratories studies for 
confirmation as appropriate: culture, 
isolation, serogroup identification, 
antimicrobial susceptibility, serology  
• Store representative isolates from the 
outbreak as needed 
• Observe changes in trends during routine 
analysis of laboratory results  
• Report results and summary data to 
national epidemiology office  
• Report laboratory results from 
screening sentinel populations at 
target sites 
International Reference 
Labs 
• Request additional specimen collection by 
laboratory or providers, as needed  
• Direct additional collection as needed based 
on outbreak investigation 
• Perform additional laboratory studies as 
appropriate  
• Report laboratory results to 
appropriate epidemiology offices 
• Use summary information in 
response to outbreaks  
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Annex 5: WHO/AFRO IDSR priority diseases 
 
NOTE:  This is a revised list of the WHO/AFRO IDSR Priority Diseases, conditions and 
events updated as of May 2008 to reflect inclusion of non-communicable diseases and 
those infectious diseases targeted by the International Health Regulations (2005).  The 
emphasis in this guide is on the provision of laboratory services for cholera, diarrhoea 
with blood, bacterial meningitis, and plague. 
Epidemic-Prone and IHR recommended Diseases, conditions and events 
1. Cholera 
2. Diarrhoea with blood (Shigella) 
3. Meningitis 
4. Plague  
5. Viral hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, 
Marburg, Rift valley fever,) 
6. Human influenza caused by a new 
Subtype 
7. Yellow Fever 
 
 
8. SARS  
9. Smallpox  
10. Dengue  
11. Trachoma 
12. Chikungunya  
13. Anthrax  
14. Typhoid fever  
15. Hepatitis –B 
16. Severe Acute Respiratory Infection 
(SARI) 
Diseases Targeted for Eradication and Elimination 
1. Poliomyelitis 
2. Dracunculiasis 
3. Leprosy 
4. Neonatal tetanus 
5. Noma 
6.      Measles 
Other Diseases of Public Health Importance 
1. Diarrhoea in children less than 5 years 
of age 
2. Pneumonia in children less than 5 years 
of age 
3. HIV/AIDS 
4. Malaria 
5. Onchocerciasis 
6. Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) 
7. Trypanosomiasis  
 
8. Tuberculosis 
9. Filariasis 
10. Buruli ulcer 
11. Asthma    
12. Diabetes mellitus   
13. Epilepsy  
14. High blood pressure   
15. Sickle cell disease  
16. Malnutrition 
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Annex 6: List of core IDSR laboratory tests for confirming outbreaks 
 
Disease Specimen When to collect Where to send 
specimen 
Type of test Comments 
Diarrhea 
with blood 
(Dysentery)  
Stool On each suspected 
case. If the 
outbreak has 
crossed the 
threshold, collect 1 
sample each on the 
first 10 suspected 
cases and later on 
10 cases  
National 
Reference Lab 
1.  Stool culture 
2.  Identification    
    by chemical test 
(note that 
S.dysenteriae 1 is 
always catalase 
negative) and  
3.   Agglutination     
      with specific       
       antisera 
For antibiotic 
sensitivity, test: 
Nalidixic acid, 
ampicillin, 
ciprofloxacin, 
cotrimoxazole, 
chloremphenicol and 
tetracycline 
Cholera Stool On each suspected 
case. If the 
outbreak has 
crossed the 
threshold, collect 
stool specimens on 
the first 10 
suspected cases 
later on 10 cases  
National 
Reference Lab 
1.  Stool culture 
2.  Identification    
     by chemical 
 tests 
3.  Serotyping by   
     specific antisera 
 agglutination 
 (polyvalent O1, 
 Ogawa, Inaba ) 
 antisera anti 
 V.cholerae 
 O139) 
For antibiotic 
sensitivity, test: 
erythromycin, 
tetracycline, nalidixic 
acid, cotrimoxazole  
Meningitis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSF for 
culture  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSF for latex 
agglutination 
 
 
CSF for 
cytology and 
Gram stain 
On each suspected 
case (even during 
non-outbreak 
season).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On each suspected 
case (even during 
non-outbreak 
season).  
National 
Reference Lab 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Provincial 
Reference Lab 
and/or District 
Lab 
District Lab 
 
Provincial and/or 
District Lab 
CSF culture with 
grouping 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latex agglutination 
 
 
 
Gram stain 
 
Cytology on CSF 
 
For antibiotic 
sensitivity, test: , 
oxacillin, 
chloremphenicol, 
cotrimoxazole, 
ceftriaxone 
 
 
Send to Reference 
Lab for confirmation 
and antibiotic 
sensitivity 
 
Send to Reference 
Lab for confirmation 
and antibiotic 
sensitivity 
Plague 
 
 
 
Serum (Blood) 
 
 
 
On each suspected 
case 
 
 
Designated 
National and/or 
Reference Labs 
 
ELISA test 
Dipstick test 
 
 
Send to national 
reference laboratory 
or to 
regional/regional 
 67 
Disease Specimen When to collect Where to send 
specimen 
Type of test Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bubo 
aspiration 
and/or 
Sputum 
 
 
On 10 first cases 
 
 
 
 
Designated 
National and/or 
Reference Lab 
 
 
 
Culture from bubo or 
sputum 
 
 
regional for 
confirmation and 
ATB sensitivity 
 
 
 
 
TB Sputum 
 
On each suspected 
case 
 
Designated 
National and/or 
reference lab 
 
Microscopy 
Culture from sputum 
 
ATB  sensitivity 
testing 
STD 
 
Urethral pus 
 
Blood 
 
On each suspected 
case 
District, 
Provincial 
 
National 
Gram stain 
 
Serology 
Culture, Sensitivity  
 
Malaria 
 
Thick blood 
smear 
 
On the first 20 
cases 
 
Designated 
National and/or 
reference lab 
 
MGG stain 
 
 
VHF Blood samples On the first 10 
cases 
Designated 
regional/internati
onal reference 
laboratories 
ELISA/PCR Send to regional or 
international 
reference laboratories 
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Annex 7: 
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Annex 8:  
 
List of recommended lab equipment for each level 
  level 1 (district) level 2 (intermediate) level 3 (referral) 
  optimum minimum optimum minimum optimum minimum 
Autoclave                   2 1 3 2 4 3 
Basic scale  1 0 1 1 2 1 
Binocular microscope  3 1 6 3 10 8 
Candle jar  2 1 2 2 3 3 
Clothes washing machine  0 0 0 0 1 0 
CO2 incubator  0 0 1 0 2 1 
Computer + printer  1 0 2 1 6 2 
Centrifuge 1 1 2 1 3 2 
Dryer                       1 0 2 1 2 2 
Electrophoresis equipment  1 0 2 1 2 2 
ELISA equipment (W/I/R)  1 0 2 1 2 2 
Emergency power supply  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Fluorescence microscope  0 0 2 1 2 1 
Freezer-20°                 1 0 2 1 2 2 
Freezer-70°                 0 0 1 0 2 1 
Fridge                      2 1 3 2 6 3 
Gel pulse electrophoresis  0 0 0 0 1 1 
Glassware kit  2 1 3 2 4 3 
Heated magnetic agitator  1 0 2 1 2 1 
Incubator, large sized  1 0 2 1 3 2 
Incubator, small sized  1 1 2 1 3 2 
Internet connection         1 1 1 1 1 1 
manipulation box            1 0 1 0 1 0 
McFarland photometer  0 0 1 0 1 1 
Media dispenser  0 0 0 0 1 0 
Oven                        1 0 2 1 2 2 
Photographic equipment  0 0 1 0 1 0 
pH meter 1 0 1 1 2 2 
Pipettes automatic 3 1 4 3 12 8 
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  level 1 (district) level 2 (intermediate) level 3 (referral) 
  optimum minimum optimum minimum optimum minimum 
Plexiglas screen  1 1 2 1 4 2 
Precision scale  1 0 1 1 2 1 
Rotative agitator  1 0 2 1 2 2 
Safety cabinet class II  0 0 1 0 2 1 
Safety cabinet class III  0 0 0 0 2 1 
Slide dryer  1 0 2 1 2 1 
Thermocycler                0 0 0 0 2 1 
Vortex                      1 0 3 1 3 2 
Washing machine  0 0 1 0 1 1 
Water distiller  1 1 2 1 2 1 
Water bath  2 1 3 2 4 2 
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Annex 9: List of supplies for outbreak investigation   
 
Note: Kits for use during rapid response activities should be assembled in advance to 
ensure correct supplies are available to correctly and safely collect the necessary 
specimens. 
 
District level:  
  Transport media (TI bottles, Cary-Blair and, APW: 25 each)  
  Latex agglutination test (15 samples of CSF) 
  Dipstick N. meningitidis A,C,Y, W135 
  Plague dipstix (25 samples) 
  Gram stain kit  
  MGG ( May Grữumwald Giemsa) Kit 
  Tuberculosis stain kit 
  Triple package boxes for appropriate transport/reference of biological  
  Samples* 
*This laboratory supply is needed at all levels 
 
Provincial/Regional Level:  
• Transport media (100 TI bottles, 100 Cary-Blair)   
• Culture media for enteric  (XLD agar, SS media, McConkey  
• agar, Hektoen enteric agar) and meningitis pathogens (chocolate agar, blood 
agar)  
• Plague dipsticks 
• Sensitivity test discs 
• Antimicrobial susceptibility testing media: Mueller Hinton Agar 
• General media 
• Latex agglutination test N. meningitidis, S. pneumoniae, Hib      
• Dipstick N.meningitidis A,C,Y, W135         
• Antisera: Anti-Shigella polyvalent and anti S.dysenteriae 1 
Anti-Vibrio cholerae O1 polyvalent 
Anti-Neisseria meningitidis A, C, W135  
         
Central/Reference level:  
o Anti-sera anti Shigella flexneri, boyidii, sonnei 
o Anti-sera anti Neisseria meningitidis serotypes (W135, A, B, C, X, Y) 
o Anti-sera anti Vibrio cholerae O Inaba and Ogawa 
o Anti-sera anti-Vibrio O139 
o AMR susceptibility testing: E-test media, IMC media 
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Annex 10: Sample form for reporting laboratory results 
 
For Health Facility: If lab specimen is collected, complete the following information and send a 
copy of this form to the lab with the specimen. 
 
Date of specimen collection: 
____/_______/______ 
 
Circle specimen source: Stool     Blood      CSF    Other:________  
Date Specimen sent to lab:  
_____/_______/______  
 
 
For the Lab: Complete this section and return the form to district team and clinician 
 
Date lab received specimen:          ______/_______/______     Circle specimen condition:     Adequate   Not adequate 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             Other disease/condition (specify): _______________ 
                                                                                                             Types of test and results: ______________________ 
______________________________ ____________________________________________________________________                                                                                                                               
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Date lab sent results to district: ______/_______/______               ____________________________   
Name of lab sending results:_______________________               Other pending tests: 
____________________________ 
 
 
                                                                                                                 Date lab results sent to 
Date district received lab results: ______/_______/______          clinician by district: ______/_______/______ 
 
NOTE: District is responsible for ensuring lab results get to clinicians. Failure to do so will undermine cooperation with clinicians on reporting of cases in 
the future 
Disease/ 
Condition             
Type of test           Results (P=pending)       Disease / 
Condition Type of 
test            
Results 
 
Cholera Culture  +    -    P Yellow Fever                             IgM +    -    P  
    Direct Exam +    -    P     ____________ Measles IgM +    -    P  
Meningitis     
                           Method used for Direct                                             
Exam 
Rubella IgM +    -    P Virus Detection 
N. meningitidis  Culture +    -    P RVF IgM +    -    P +    -    P 
S. pneumonia  Culture +    -    P Ebola IgM +    -    P +    -    P 
H. influenza  Culture +    -    P CCHF IgM +    -    P +    -    P 
N. meningitidis  Latex +    -    P Lassa IgM +    -    P +    -    P 
S. pneumonia  Latex +    -    P Marburg IgM +    -    P +    -    P 
H. influenza  Latex +    -    P     
Shigella Dysenteriae  Culture SD type 1   Other shig    No 
shig 
    
Plague Culture +    -    P     
 IFA>1: 64  +    -    P 
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Annex 11:  
Revised Proposed Laboratory Indicators for Measuring Progress with the Lab Component of IDSR --REVISED 030906 
The diseases/pathogens of concern for this evaluation are: ______________________________________________________________________ 
Time period to be covered by this evaluation is:  FROM ___________________  TO _____________________ 
  
Number 
Indicators Denominator Numerator Source of information 
What it 
measures  
Interpretation Frequency 
of analysis 
1 Proportion of district 
laboratories reporting lab data 
on selected priority pathogen 
confirmed in specimens 
collected in the district to 
higher level for the month 
Total number of 
district labs  
Number of district 
labs that submitted 
monthly data to 
higher level 
National log 
book of 
reports 
received 
Functional 
reporting system 
If districts are 
collecting and 
reporting lab data to 
higher level 
quarterly or 
semi-
annually 
2 Proportion of district 
laboratories that have 
transported adequate 
diagnostic specimens to 
provincial labs (Record 
responses separately for each 
disease or pathogen included 
in the evaluation) 
Total number of 
district labs 
AND the number 
expected to refer 
specimens 
Number of district 
labs from which 
adequate specimens 
were received 
Provincial 
log of routine 
reports 
received 
Collection, 
storage, 
transportation of 
specimens 
Awareness of referral 
of priority specimens, 
and availability of 
needed logistics 
quarterly or 
semi-
annually 
3 Proportion of district 
laboratories that received at 
least one supervisory visit 
with written feedback by 
provincial/national level 
Total number of 
district 
laboratories 
Number of district 
laboratories that 
received at least one 
supervision activity  
Reports of 
the District 
Lab Focal 
Person -this 
may require 
field visits 
Capacity of 
higher levels to 
supervise district 
labs 
Is district lab 
receiving support 
supervision to help to 
solve problems 
annually 
4 Proportion of provincial 
laboratories reporting 
analysed lab data to the 
national lab 
Total number of 
provincial 
laboratories  
Number of 
provincial 
laboratories 
analysing and 
reporting to NPHL 
monthly 
NPHL  Functional lab-
based 
surveillance 
system 
If provincial levels 
analyse district 
laboratory data 
quarterly 
 74 
 
5 Proportion of provincial 
(regional in some countries) 
laboratories reporting culture 
results for designated 
pathogens (Record responses 
separately for each disease or 
pathogen included in the 
evaluation) 
Total number of 
provincial  
(regional in 
some countries) 
laboratories 
Number of 
provincial (regional 
in some countries)  
laboratories 
reporting culture 
results 
NPHL Technical 
competence; 
presence of a 
network; 
availability of 
reagents 
&supplies 
If provincial (regional 
in some countries) labs 
are able to perform 
confirmatory testing 
for designated 
pathogens 
quarterly 
6 Proportion of provincial 
laboratories that received at 
least one supervisory visit 
with written feedback by 
central level 
Total number of 
provincial 
laboratories 
Number of 
provincial 
laboratories 
supervised by NPHL 
at least once, with 
written report 
NPHL, MoH Capacity of 
central levels to 
supervise 
provincial labs 
Are provincial labs 
receiving supervision 
to support them as 
frontline centers for 
diagnosis of priority 
IDSR diseases 
annualy 
7 Proportion of outbreaks with 
timely laboratory investigation 
(Record responses separately 
for each disease or pathogen 
included in the evaluation) 
Total number of 
outbreaks 
Number of 
outbreaks with lab 
investigation within 
prescribed time-
frame 
NPHL and 
MoH 
Link between Epi 
and Public Health 
Lab 
Are labs participating 
timely in outbreak 
investigation 
Post-
epidemic 
analysis 
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Annex 12:  Requirements of national laboratories in the   
                   context of IHR- core capacity checklist 
 
  
• Guidelines, including measures related to biosafety and the cold chain, are available  
• An operational system for collection, packaging and transport of samples to and from 
laboratories is in place. 
• High quality outside collaborating centers are identified to allow laboratory identification 
of epidemic-prone diseases and public health risks when there is no corresponding quality 
controlled domestic capacity available. 
• An inventory of country laboratory capacity for alert and response is available and a list 
of laboratories designated by the Ministry of Health as part of the national system for 
alert and response has been established according to the public health priority threats. 
• The role and responsibilities of each laboratory within the laboratory system is 
established, as well as the functional rules of the laboratory system within the national 
alert and response system. 
• All laboratories that are part of the alert and response system are engaged in a credential 
quality assurance programme based on national quality standards and regularly tested 
through exercises 
• Protocol are preestablished for the participation of laboratories in investigation 
• Mechanisms are set to better link laboratories and epidemiology teams 
• All laboratories that are part of the alert and response system participate successfully in 
interlaboratory comparison programmes (i.e. external quality assessment schemes 
through proficiency testing or rechecking). 
• When feasible, an IHR national laboratory coordinator is designated to ensure the 
coordination of the laboratory system. 
• When feasible, the NRL (or acting reference laboratories) part of the alert and response 
system are accredited to the internationally recognized standards, (WHO, ISO or 
equivalent). 
• When feasible, digital Laboratory Information Systems suited to surveillance and 
response requirements are in place to track and monitor relevant laboratory data. 
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Annex 13: Specimens for laboratory confirmation for priority diseases at the district level 
 
 
Suspected disease or 
condition 
Diagnostic test Specimen When to collect 
How  to prepare, store 
and transport 
Results 
Anthrax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference: 
WHO Recommended Surveillance 
Standards 
WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2 
 
Cutaneous Anthrax: 
Recommended specimens for 
Microbiology and Pathology for 
Diagnosis, CDC 
Isolation of Bacillus anthracis from 
a clinical specimen (e.g. blood, 
lesions, discharges) 
 
Demonstration of B.anthracis in a 
clinical specimen by microscopic 
examination of stained smears 
(vesicular fluid, blood, 
cerebrospinal fluid, pleural fluid, 
stools) 
 
Positive serology (ELISA, Western 
blot, toxin detection, 
chromatographic assay, fluorescent 
antibody test) 
Cutaneous 
• Vesicular 
• Eschar  
 
Gastro-intestinal 
• Stool 
• Blood 
 
Inhalation 
• Sputum 
• Blood 
 
 
 
Specimens should be collected 
from any patient being evaluated 
for cutaneous Bacillus anthracis 
infection.  
It may not be possible to 
demonstrate B.anthracis in clinical 
specimens if the patient has been 
treated with antimicrobial agents.  
Organism is best demonstrated in 
specimen taken at the Vesicular 
stage  
 
Vesicular stage: collect fluid from 
intact vesicles on sterile swabs.  
Eschar stage: without removing 
eschar, insert swab beneath the 
edge of eschar, rotate and collect 
lesion material 
• Store specimen for ≤24 h and 
transport for  ≤2h at room 
temperature 
Stool: collect 5-10 g in a clean 
sterile leak-proof container. Store 
for ≤24 h at 4°C. Transport ≤1h at 
room temperature. 
Blood: collect per institution’s 
procedure for routine blood 
culture. Collect 10 ml of blood in 
EDTA for PCR. Transport ≤2h in 
room temperature. 
Sputum: collect expectorated 
specimen into a sterile leak proof 
container. Store for ≤24 h at 4°C. 
Transport ≤2 h in room temp. 
Diagnostic services for Anthrax are 
not routinely available. Advance 
arrangements are usually required for 
Anthrax diagnostic services. Contact 
the appropriate National authority or 
WHO. 
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Suspected disease or 
condition 
Diagnostic test Specimen When to collect 
How  to prepare, store 
and transport 
Results 
Chikungunya 
 
 
 
Reference:  
• Sergon et al  Seroprevalence 
of Chikungunya Virus 
(CHIKV) Infection on Lamu 
Island, Kenya, October 
2004. Am J Trop Med Hyg. 
2008 Feb;78(2):333-337 
• Powers et al. Evolutionary 
relationships and systematics 
of the alphaviruses. J Virol. 
2001 Nov;75(21):10118-31 
 
Serological tests show a rise in 
antibody titer to chikungunya virus; 
the virus may be isolated from the 
blood of acutely ill patients in 
newborn mice, mosquitoes or cell 
culture or detected using IFA or 
Reverse Transcrition Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) 
Serum 
 
 
Collect specimen from the first 
suspected case. 
If more than one suspected case, 
collect until specimens have been 
collected from 5 to10 suspected 
cases. If outbreak is confirmed, 
collect more specimens from cases 
and also mosquitoes from the 
affected homes for testing 
Type of Specimen 
•  Acute-phase blood (0-10 
days after onset) 
•  Convalescent-phase blood (7 
- 21 days after onset) 
  
Time of collection 
• When patient presents; 
collect second sample during 
convalescence. Between days 
7 and 21 after onset. 
Transport of specimens should 
comply with the WHO guidelines 
for the safe transport of infectious 
substances and diagnostic 
specimens (WHO, 1997). 
  
For ELISA: 
• Refrigerate at 2º to 8º C 
serum or clot for testing 
within 24 hour. If kept for 
longer store at -80º.  
For Isolation and RT_PCR 
• Store at -80º or transport in 
fully charged dry shipper. 
• Mosquitoes for testing should be 
transported in fully charged 
dry shipper. Focus on Aedes 
species 
Diagnostic services for Chik are not 
routinely available. Contact the 
appropriate National authority or 
WHO. 
  
• Minstry of Health, Disease 
Outbreak Management Unit 
should send samples to WHO 
reference labs e.g KEMRI 
• Preliminary results are ready 
within 24 hours after samples 
arrive in the laboratory. 
Confirmatory results are ready 
within a week from sample 
reception. 
 
Poliomyelitis 
 
REFERENCE: 
• WHO global action plan for 
laboratory containment of 
wild polio viruses. 
WHO/V&B/99.32, Geneva, 
1999 
• Manual for the virological 
investigation of polio,WHO/ 
EPI/GEN/97.01, Geneva, 
2004 
• Supplement to the Manual 
for the virological 
investigation of Polio- 
WHO/EPI 2007 
Isolation of polio virus from stool 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stool 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: If no specimen 
is collected, re-
evaluate patient 
after 60 days to 
confirm clinical 
diagnosis of polio 
(AFP). 
Collect a sample from every 
suspected AFP case. 
Collect the first specimen when the 
case is investigated. 
Collect a second specimen on the 
same patient 24 to 48 hours later. 
• Place stool in clean, leak-proof 
container and label clearly. 
• Immediately place in 
refrigerator or cold box not 
used for storing vaccines or 
other medicines. 
• Transport specimens so they 
will arrive at designated polio 
laboratory within 72 hours of 
collection 
• When there is a delay, and 
specimen will not be 
transported within 72 hours, 
freeze specimen at -20°C or 
colder. Then transport frozen 
specimen with dry ice or cold 
packs also frozen at -20°C or 
colder. 
Confirmed results are usually 
available within 21 after receipt of 
specimen by the laboratory. 
If wild or vaccine derived polio virus 
is detected, the national program will 
plan appropriate response actions  
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Suspected disease or 
condition 
Diagnostic test Specimen When to collect 
How  to prepare, store 
and transport 
Results 
Cholera 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCE: 
“Laboratory Methods for the 
Diagnosis of Epidemic Dysentery 
and Cholera.” CDC/WHO, 1999 
CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA 
Isolate V. cholerae from stool 
culture and determine O1 serotype 
using polyvalent antisera for V. 
cholerae O1. 
 
If desired, confirm identification 
with Inaba and Ogawa antisera. 
If specimen is not serotypable, 
consider, V. cholerae O139 (see 
note in Results column). 
Liquid stool or rectal 
swab 
Collect stool sample from the first 
suspected cholera case. If more 
than one suspected case, collect 
until specimens have been 
collected from 5 to 10 cases. 
Collect stool from patients fitting 
the case definition and: 
 
• onset within last 5 days, and 
• before antibiotics treatment 
has started 
 
Do not delay treatment of 
dehydrated patients. Specimens 
may be collected after rehydration 
(ORS or IV therapy) has begun. 
 
• Place specimen (stool or 
rectal swab) in a clean, leak 
proof container and transport 
to lab within 2 hours. 
• If more than 2- hour delay is 
expected, place stool-soaked 
swab into Cary-Blair transport 
medium. 
 
If Cary-Blair transport medium is 
not available and specimen will not 
reach the lab within 2 hours: 
 
• Store at 4°C to 8°C 
• Do not allow specimen to dry. 
Add small amount of 0.85% 
NaCl if necessary 
• To transport, transport in well  
marked, leak proof container 
• Transport container in cold box 
at 4ºC to 8ºC 
 
• Cholera tests may not be 
routinely performed in all 
laboratories. 
• Culture results usually take 2 to 
4 days after specimen arrives at 
the laboratory. 
• Cary-Blair transport medium is 
stable and usually good for at 
least one year after preparation. 
It does not require refrigeration 
if kept sterile and in properly 
sealed container. If colour 
changes (medium turns yellow) 
or shrinks (depressed meniscus), 
do not use the medium. 
• The O139 serotype has not been 
reported in Africa and only in a 
few places in southwest Asia. 
• Serological determination of 
Ogawa or Inaba is not clinically 
required. It is also not required if 
polyvalent antisera results are 
clearly positive. 
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Diarrhoea with blood (Shigella 
dysenteriae 
type 1) and other shigellae 
Note: SD1 infections are 
epidemic-prone and associated 
with high levels of antibiotic 
resistance. SD1 is the most 
significant of the shigellae due to 
the high levels of mortality in the 
young and elderly and due to its 
association with haemolytic 
uremic syndrome (HUS). 
REFERENCE: 
“Laboratory Methods for the 
Diagnosis of Epidemic Dysentery 
and Cholera”. CDC/WHO, 1999 
CDC, Atlanta, GA, USA 
Isolate Shigella dysenteriae type 1 
(SD1) in culture to confirm 
shigella outbreak. 
If SD1 is confirmed, perform 
antibiotic sensitivity tests with 
appropriate drugs. 
 
 
 
 
Stool or rectal swab. 
 
Collect sample when an outbreak 
is suspected. Collect stool from 
5-10 patients who have bloody 
diarrhoea and: 
 
·Onset within last 4 days, 
and 
·Before antibiotic 
treatment has started. 
Preferably, collect stool in a 
clean, dry container. Do not 
contaminate with urine. Sample 
stool with a swab, selecting 
portions of the specimen with 
blood or mucus. 
If stool can not be collected, 
obtain a rectal swab sample with 
a clean, cotton swab. 
Place stool swab or rectal 
swab in Cary-Blair transport medium. 
Transport to laboratory refrigerated. 
 
If Cary-Blair not available, 
send sample to lab within 2 hours 
in a clean, dry container with a 
tightly-fitting cap. Specimens not 
preserved in Cary-Blair will have 
significant reduction of shigellae 
after 24 hours. 
If storage is required, hold 
specimens at 4°C to 8°C, and do 
not freeze. 
Culture results are usually 
available 2 to 4 days after 
receipt by the laboratory. 
 
SD1 isolates should be 
characterized by antibiotic 
susceptibility. 
 
After confirmation of an initial 
5-10 cases in an outbreak, 
sample only a small number of 
cases until the outbreak ends. 
 
Refer to disease specific 
guidelines in Section 8.0 for 
additional information about 
the epidemic potential of 
Shigella dysenteriae 1 
Dengue fever 
 
Reference:   
WHO Recommended 
Surveillance Standards 
WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2 
 
Dengue: clinical and Public 
Health Aspects/CDC 
 
Note: there are several diagnostic 
techniques available to 
document an infection by 
the dengue virus. The IgM 
ELISA is the basic test for 
serologic diagnosis. 
Isolation of the dengue virus from 
serum, plasma or autopsy samples. 
Demonstration of a four fold or 
greater change in reciprocal IgG or 
IgM antibody titres to one or more 
dengue virus antigens in paired 
serum samples. 
Demonstration of dengue virus 
antigen in autopsy tissue by 
immunohistochemistry or 
immunofluorescence or in serum 
samples by EIA. 
Detection of viral genomic 
sequences in autopsy tissue, serum 
or CSF samples by PCR. 
 ELISA:: Whole blood, 
serum or plasma 
 
PCR: Whole blood or 
blood clot,  serum/ plasma 
or tissue 
 
The samples should be 
collected for diagnosing 
a suspected dengue 
fatality: 
A blood sample to 
attempt virus isolation 
and serology. If an 
autopsy is performed, 
blood from the heart 
should be collected. 
Collect specimen from the first 
suspected case. 
If more than one suspected case, 
collect until specimens have been 
collected from 5 to10 suspected 
cases. 
Type of Specimen 
• Acute-phase blood (0-5 days 
after onset) 
• Convalescent-phase blood (≥ 
6 days after onset) 
Time of collection 
•  Collect 2nd sample during 
convalescence. Between 
days 6 and 21 after onset. 
• Lab diagnosis of fatal cases is 
indispensable for 
understanding the risk factors 
for severe cases.  
Transport of specimens should 
comply with the WHO guidelines for 
the safe transport of infectious 
substances and diagnostic specimens 
(WHO, 1997). 
 
For ELISA or PCR: 
• Refrigerate serum or clot 
• Freeze (-20C or colder) tissue 
specimens for virus isolation 
 
 If an autopsy has been perfomed and 
no fresh tissues are available, 
tissues fixed in formalin should be 
submitted for 
immunohistochemical studies. 
Diagnostic services for 
DF/DHF are not routinely 
available. Advance 
arrangements are usually 
required for VHF diagnostic 
services. Contact the 
appropriate National authority 
or WHO. 
 
 
Dracunculiasis 
Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required.  
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Human influenza caused by a 
new Subtype  
 
Reference: 
Recommended laboratory tests 
to identify avian influenza virus  
A in specimens from humans, 
WHO, revised August 2007. 
 
Collecting, preserving and 
shipping specimens for the 
diagnosis of avian influenza 
A(H5N1) virus infection. Guide 
for field operations, October 
2006 
WHO/CDS/EPR/ARO/2006.1 
Identification of human influenza 
virus infections by: 
1) Detection of influenza-
specific RNA by 
reverse transcriptase-
polymerase chain 
reaction  
2) Isolation in cell culture 
(BSL3 lab required for 
suspected new subtype) 
3) Direct antigen detection 
(low sensitivity) 
 
 
A variety of specimens 
are suitable for the 
diagnosis: 
• Throat swab 
• Nasopharyngeal 
swab 
• Nasal swab 
• Nasopharyngeal 
aspirate 
•  Intubated patients: 
tracheal swab or 
broncholavage 
fluid 
• Blood  
 
Specimens should be 
collected in the 
following order of 
priority: 
• Throat 
swab/Nasopharyng
eal aspirate 
• Acute serum 
• Convalescent 
serum 
 
Obtained specimen within 3 days 
of the onset of symptoms,  
Initial specimens (respiratory or 
blood) should ideally be collected 
from suspected patients before 
antiviral therapy is begun but 
treatment must not be delayed in 
order to take specimens.  
Optimally, paired sera (3-5 ml of 
whole blood), collected first 
during the acute phase of illness 
and then 14 days or later after the 
onset of illness, should be tested 
simultaneously. 
Specimens should be collected 
from deceased patients as soon as 
possible after death 
Respiratory specimens should be 
transported in virus transport media. 
Media that could be used for a variety 
of viruses are commercially available. 
 
Specimens in viral transport medium 
for viral isolation should be kept at 4°C 
and transported to the laboratory 
promptly. If specimen is transported 
within 2 days, it may be kept at 4°C; 
otherwise should be frozen at or below 
-70 °C until transported to the 
laboratory. Repeated freezing and 
thawing must be avoided to prevent 
loss of infectivity. 
 
Sera may be stored at 4°C for 
approximately one week, but thereafter 
should be frozen at -20°C.  
Transport of specimens should 
comply with the WHO guidelines for 
the safe transport of infectious 
substances and diagnostic specimens  
• Laboratory results should 
be confirmed by an 
approved laboratory.  
• Any specimen with a 
positive result for 
influenza A virus and 
suspected of avian 
influenza infection/new 
subtype should be further 
tested and verified by a 
designated WHO CC/ 
WHO H5 Reference 
laboratory. Laboratories 
that lack the capacity to 
perform specific influenza 
A subtype identification 
procedures are requested 
to: 
• Forward specimens or 
virus isolates to a 
National Influenza Centre 
or to a WHO CC/WHO 
H5 Reference Laboratory 
for further identification 
or characterisation. 
• Inform the WHO Office 
in the country that 
specimens or virus 
isolates are being 
forwarded to other 
laboratories for further 
identification or further 
characterization. 
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HIV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCE: 
Guidelines for Second Generation 
HIV Surveillance, WHO and 
UNAIDS, 2000 
WHO/CDC/CSR/EDC/2000.5 
ELISA for HIV 
 
or 
 
Refer to national HIV/AIDS 
program guidelines for 
recommended diagnostic test in 
your area.  
Blood 
Obtain specimens according to 
national HIV/AIDS program 
strategy for clinical or 
epidemiological sampling. 
Use universal precautions to minimize 
exposure to sharps and any body fluid. 
ELISA: Collect 10 ml of venous 
blood. 
• Let clot retract for 30 to 60 
minutes at room temperature or 
centrifuge to separate serum 
from red blood cells. 
• Aseptically pour off serum into 
sterile, screw capped tubes. 
• Store serum at 4°C. 
• Transport serum samples using      
appropriate packaging to            
prevent breakage or leakage. 
HIV testing is highly regulated 
with strict controls on release of 
information. Results are usually 
available within one week from 
arrival in the laboratory. 
Leprosy 
Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required. 
Malaria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCE: 
“Basic Laboratory Methods in 
Medical Parasitology” WHO, 
Geneva, 1991  
• Presence of malarial parasites 
in blood films for suspected 
cases admitted to inpatient 
facility 
 
 
• Malaria Rapid diagnostic test 
 Hematocrit or haemoglobin for 
suspected malaria in children 2 
months to 5 years in age. 
Blood 
Usually finger-stick 
sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blood 
Usually finger-stick 
sample 
Finger stick or other 
accepted method for 
collecting blood from 
young children 
For blood smear: prepare blood 
film for all suspected cases 
admitted to inpatient facility, or 
according to national malaria 
case management guidelines 
 
 
 
 
For hematocrit or haemoglobin: 
In the inpatient setting, perform a  
laboratory test confirming severe 
anaemia 
Blood smear: Collect blood directly 
onto correctly cleaned and labelled 
microscope slides and prepare thick 
and thin smears. 
• Allow smears to dry thoroughly 
• Stain using the appropriate stain 
and technique 
• Store stained and thoroughly 
dried slides at room temperature 
out of direct sunlight. 
• Collect specimen and perform 
test according to manufacturers’ 
instructions. 
Hematocrit or haemoglobin: Collect 
specimen according to instructions in 
national guidelines. 
Thick and thin smear results 
can be available the same day 
as preparation. 
 
Microscopic examination of 
malarial slides may also reveal 
the presence of other blood-
borne parasites. 
 
 
 
 
 
RDT result is obtained 
immediately. 
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Lymphatic filariasis • Night blood smear 
• Filarial antigen test 
Blood smear  
 
 
 
 
 
Blood 
Night between 10pm and 2am 
 
 
 
Any time of the day 
Spread three drops of blood on a glass 
slide and spread across the slide to make 
three lines. After fixing with heat stain 
with geimsa stain and examine under 
microscope 
Either a rapid ICT card test or by an lab 
based ELISA test 
Positive test is when microfilarieae of 
W.bancrofti is seen under the microscope 
 
Positive if filarial  antigen is detected 
Measles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCE: 
WHO Guidelines for 
Epidemic Preparedness 
and Response to Measles 
Outbreaks 
WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.1 
Presence of IgM 
antibodies to measles virus 
in serum. 
Serum Collect blood samples on 5 
suspected measles cases when the 
number of cases exceeds the 
measles outbreak threshold 
(usually more than 5 cases in a 
district in a month). 
  
In countries with an elimination 
target: 
• Collect specimen from 
every suspected case of 
measles 
 
• Collect serum for antibody 
testing at first opportunity or 
first visit to the health 
facility. 
 
• For children, collect 1 to 5 ml of 
venous blood depending on size of 
child. Collect into a test tube, 
capillary tube or microtainer. 
• Separate blood cells from serum.  
Let clot retract for 30 to 60 minutes 
at room temperature. Centrifuge at 
2000 rpm for 10-20 minutes and 
pour off serum into a clean glass 
tube. 
• If no centrifuge, put sample in 
refrigerator overnight (4 to 6 hours) 
until clot retracts. Pour off serum the 
next morning. 
• If no centrifuge and no refrigerator, 
let blood sit at an angle for at least 
60 minutes (without shaking or 
being driven in a vehicle). Pour off 
serum into a clean tube. 
•  Store serum at 4°C. 
• Transport serum samples using 
appropriate packaging to prevent 
breaking or leaks during transport. 
The specimen should arrive at the laboratory 
within 3 days of being collected. 
  
Results are usually available after 7 days. 
  
If as few as 2 out of 5 suspected measles 
cases are laboratory confirmed, the outbreak 
is confirmed. 
  
Avoid shaking of specimen before serum has 
been collected. 
  
To prevent bacterial overgrowth, ensure that 
the serum is poured into a clean glass test 
tube. The test tube does not need to be sterile, 
just clean. 
  
Transport the serum in an EPI hand vaccine 
carrier to 4ºC to 8ºC to prevent bacterial 
overgrowth (up to 7 days).  If not 
refrigerated, serum stored in a clean tube will 
be good for at least 3 days. 
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Meningitis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCE: 
“Laboratory Methods for 
the Diagnosis of 
Meningitis Caused by 
Neisseria meningitidis, 
Streptococcus pneumoniae 
and Haemophilus 
influenzae.” 
WHO document 
WHO/CDS/EDC/99.7 
WHO, Geneva 
Microscopic examination 
of CSF for Gram negative 
diplococci 
Culture and isolation of N. 
meningitidis from CSF  
Cerebral spinal fluid 
(CSF) 
 
 
 
Note: CSF is the 
specimen of choice for 
culture and microscopic 
exam. If CSF not 
available, collect blood 
(10 ml adults, 1-5 ml for 
children) for culture. 
Collect specimens from 5 to 10 
cases once the alert or epidemic 
threshold (see “Meningitis” in 
Section 8.0) has been reached. 
• Prepare the patient and aseptically 
collect CSF into sterile test tubes 
with tops. 
 
• Immediately place 1 ml of CSF into 
a pre-warmed bottle of trans-isolate 
medium. 
• Incubate at body temperature (36EC 
to 37EC). 
 
• Never refrigerate specimens that 
will be cultured. 
 
• Keep CSF for microscopic exam 
and chemistry in the original syringe 
(replace cap). Refrigerate the 
capped syringe and send it to the 
laboratory as soon as possible. 
Isolation of Neiserria meningitidis, a 
fastidious organism, is expensive, and 
difficult. It requires excellent techniques for 
specimen collection and handling and 
expensive media and antisera. 
 
Initial specimens in an outbreak or for singly 
occurring isolates of N. meningitis should be 
serotyped and an antibiogram performed to 
ensure appropriate treatment. 
 
Trans Isolate medium (TI) is stable. If 
properly stored at temperature (4ºC) it can be 
kept for up to two years after preparation. In 
the refrigerator, the liquid phase turns 
gelatinous but reliquifies at room 
temperature. Unused TI bottles should be 
kept tightly sealed. If there is any colour 
change (yellowing or clouding of the liquid 
medium) or drying or shrinkage of the agar 
slant, the medium should not be used. 
Neonatal tetanus Laboratory confirmation is not required. 
Onchocerciasis Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required. 
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Plague 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCE: 
“Plague Manual: 
Epidemiology, 
Distribution, Surveillance 
and Control”. 
WHO/CDS/EDC/99.2 
WHO, Geneva, 1999 
 
“Laboratory Manual of 
Plague Diagnostic tests.” 
CDC/WHO publication, 
2000, Atlanta, GA 
Isolation of Yersinia pestis 
from bubo aspirate or 
from culture of blood, 
CSF or sputum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identification of 
antibodies to the Y. pestis 
F1 antigen from serum. 
Aspirate of buboes, 
blood, CSF, sputum, 
tracheal washes or 
autopsy materials for 
culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blood for serological 
tests 
Collect specimen from the first 
suspected plague case. If 
more than one suspected 
case, collect until specimens 
have been collected on 5 to 
10 suspected cases before 
the administration of 
antibiotics. 
With buboes, a small amount of 
sterile saline (1-2 ml) may 
be injected into the bubo to 
obtain an adequate specimen 
 
• If antibiotics have been 
started, plague can be 
confirmed by 
seroconversion (4-fold or 
greater rise in titer) to the 
F1 antigen by passive 
hemaglutination using 
pared sera. Serum should be 
drawn within 5 days of 
onset then again after 2-3 
weeks.  
• Specimens should be collected using 
aseptic techniques. Materials for 
culture should be sent to the 
laboratory in Cary Blair transport 
media or frozen (preferably with dry 
ice (frozen CO2). Unpreserved 
specimens should reach the 
laboratory the same day. 
• Liquid specimens (aspirates) should 
be absorbed with a sterile cotton 
swab and placed into Cary-Blair 
transport medium. Refrigerate. 
• If transport will require 24 or more 
hours and Cary Blair transport is not 
available, freeze the specimen and 
transport it frozen with cool packs. 
 
Cultures should only be sent to a laboratory 
with known plague diagnostic capabilities or 
to a WHO Collaborating Centre for Plague. 
 
Plague culture results will take a minimum 
of 3 to 5 working days from reception in the 
laboratory. 
 
Antibiotic treatment should be initiated 
before culture results are obtained. 
Plague patients seroconvert to the F1 Y. 
pestis antigen 7-10 days after onset. 
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Rift Valley disease 
 
Reference: 
Fact sheet Nº207 Revised 
September 2007. 
Infection Control for VHF 
in the African Health Care 
Setting /CDC (Annexes 
11-12) 
Acute RVF can be 
diagnosed using several 
different methods. 
Serological tests such as 
ELISA may confirm the 
presence of specific IgM 
antibodies to the virus. 
The virus itself may be 
detected in blood during 
the early phase of illness 
or in post-mortem tissue 
using a variety of 
techniques including virus 
propagation (in cell 
cultures or inoculated 
animals), antigen 
detection tests and RT-
PCR. 
ELISA (serology) 
• Whole blood 
• Serum or plasma 
• PCR 
• Whole blood or 
clot 
• Tissues (fresh 
frozen) 
• Serum/plasma 
• Liver biopsy from 
fatal cases 
• Tissue biopsy from 
fatal cases 
 
Collect specimen from the first 
suspected case. 
• If more than one suspected 
case, collect until 
specimens have been 
collected from 5 to10 
suspected cases. 
Laboratory workers are at risk. Samples 
taken from suspected human cases of 
RVF for diagnosis should be handled by 
trained staff and processed in suitably 
equipped laboratories.  
ELISA/PCR 
• Preparation and storage (freeze of 
refrigerate/as cold as possible) 
• Shipping : frozen on dry ice or ice 
packs or both 
Note: if dry ice or ice packs are not 
available, sample may be shipped at room 
temperature and still provide valid results 
in most cases. 
Immunohistochemistry: 
• Preparation and storage :Fix in 
formalin (can be stored up to 6  
wks)  
• Shipping: Room temperature (do not 
freeze). 
Diagnostic services for RVF are not 
routinely available. Advance arrangements 
are usually required for VHF diagnostic 
services. Contact the appropriate National 
authority or WHO. 
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SARS  
 
Reference: 
Use of laboratory methods 
for SARS diagnosis, 
WHO 
 
WHO Biosafety 
guidelines for handling of 
SARS specimens 
 
A practical Guide for 
SARS laboratories: from 
samples collection to 
shipment. WHO, 29 Dec 
2003.  
Confirmed positive PCR 
for SARS virus: 
• At least 2 different 
clinical specimens 
(eg nasopharyngeal 
and stool) OR 
• The same clinical 
specimen collected 
on 2 or more days 
during the course of 
the illness (eg 2 or 
more naspharyngeal 
aspirates) OR 
• 2 different assays or 
repeat PCR using the 
original clinical 
sample on each 
occasion of testing 
 
Seronconversion by 
ELISA or IFA: 
• Negative antibody 
test on acute serum 
followed by positive 
antibody test on 
convalescent serum 
OR 
• Four-fold or greater 
rise in antibody titre 
between acute and 
convalescent phase 
sera tested in 
parallel. 
 
Virus isolation: 
Isolation in cell culture of 
SARS-Cov from any 
specimen; plus PCR 
confirmation using a 
validated method 
Nasopharyngeal 
wash/aspirate specimen 
of choice for respiratory 
viruses. 
Nasopharyngeal swabs 
or oropharyngeal swabs 
Stool 
Serum  
 
 
The respiratory tract specimen 
can be collected at any time, but 
are best taken during the acute 
phase of illness. 
 
The time collection of paired 
blood samples is very important:  
• Collect an acute illness 
sample at first contact with   
the patient at days 7, 14, 28 
and 90 after onset where 
possible. 
• Collect blood on discharge 
if collection of a 
convalescent sample is 
unlikely. 
 
• SARS specimens should be handled 
according to appropriate biosafety 
practices in order to avoid 
laboratory-related infections and 
spread of disease to close contacts. 
• Clinical samples from patients 
should be collected by trained 
personnel. 
Nasopharyngeal wash/aspirate: have the 
patient sit with the head titled slightly 
backward. Instill 1.5 ml non-bacteriostatic 
sterile saline (Ph 7.0) into one nostril. 
Flush a plastic catheter or tubing (e.g. 
mucus trap tubing) with 2-3 ml of saline. 
Insert the tubing into the nostril parallel to 
the palate. Aspirate nasopharyngeal 
secretions. Repeat for the other nostril. 
Collect aspirates in sterile vial or mucus 
trap. Remove tubings and discard in plastic 
bag. 
Nasopharyngeal or oropharyngeal swabs: 
use only sterile Dacron or rayon swab 
with plastic shafts. Place each swab 
immediately in a tube containing Virus 
Transport Media (VTM). 
Serum collection: Collect 5-10 ml of 
whole blood in a serum separator tube. 
Allow blood to clot 
Respiratory / stool / blood/serum 
specimens: Refrigerate immediately 
(4°C).  If transport/shipping will be 
international or will occur > 5 days after 
collection of last specimen, freeze the 
specimens at – 20 °C (serum), -20/-70 °C 
(respiratory specimens) for planned 
shipping with dry ice if available.  
Fixed tissues (formalin fixed) from all 
major organs. Store and ship fixed tissue 
at room temperature. 
Diagnostic services for SARS are not 
routinely available. Advance arrangements 
are usually required for SARS diagnostic 
services. Contact the appropriate National 
authority or WHO. 
 
 
Sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs) Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required. 
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Smallpox  
 
 
Reference: 
Specimen selection 
desase, CDC 
 
Smallpox, Potential   
Bioterrorism agent: 
category A, Oct 02  
Isolation of smallpox 
(variola) virus from a 
clinical specimen  
Or 
Polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) essay identification 
of variola DNA in a 
clinical specimen 
Or 
Negative stain electron 
microscopic identification 
of variola virus in a 
clinical specimen 
 
Note: Level C or D 
laboratories only. 
 
 
Biopsy specimens 
 
Scabs 
 
Vesicular fluid 
 
Blood samples 
 
Note: blood samples 
from person where 
severe, dense rash may 
be difficult to draw as 
the skin may slough off. 
A central line may be 
needed for access in 
cases where a peripheral 
blood draw is difficult. 
A suspected case of smallpox is a 
public health and medical 
emergency. Collect samples from 
every suspected case. 
Typical practices associated with 
collection of patient specimens are 
appropriate for collection of 
orthopoxvirus lesions as well. These 
include wearing personal protective 
equipment, including gloves and 
sanitizing the site prior to collection. If 
alcohol is used to prepare the lesion for 
collection it is important to allow the 
lesion to dry before it is collected. 
biopsy specimens: aseptically place two 
to four portions of tissue into a sterile, 
leakproof, freezable container. Storage -
20 °C to - 70 °C. Transport ~6h at 4 °C. 
Note: package non-formalin lesion biopsy 
for shipping on dry ice, leave formalin 
fixed biopsy at room temperature. Do  not 
freeze formalin fixed biopsy sample. 
Scabs: aseptically place 
scrapings/material into a sterile, 
leakproof, freezable container. Storage -
20 °C to - 70 °C. Transport ~6h at 4 °C. 
Vesicular fluid: collect fluid from 
separate lesions onto separate sterile 
swabs. Be sure to include cellular material 
from the based of each respective 
vesicule. Storage -20 °C to - 70 °C. 
Transport ~6h at 4 °C. 
Draw 10 cc of blood into a plastic marble-
topped tube, or a plastic yellow-topped 
serum separator tube. 
Note: approval must be obtained prior to 
the shipment of potential smallpox patient 
clinical specimens to a Reference 
laboratory. 
Diagnostic services for Smallpox are not 
routinely available. Advance arrangements 
are usually required for Smallpox diagnostic 
services. Contact the appropriate National 
authority or WHO. 
 
 
Trypanosomiasis Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required. 
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Smear positive pulmonary 
Tuberculosis  
 
REFERENCE: 
Laboratory Services in 
Tuberculosis Control, 
Parts I, II and III. WHO 
publications 
WHO/TB/98.258 
 
Presence of acid fast 
bacillus (AFB) in Ziehl 
Neelsen (ZN) stained 
smears 
Deep-chest sputum Collect sputum (not saliva) for 
direct smear microscopy and 
examine at least two stained 
specimens taken on different 
days. 
Smear should be examined at health 
facility where the specimen is taken. 
TB microscopy is read daily. Quantification 
of observed mycobacterium are reported 
using various reporting methods. Refer to 
the criteria used by the examining 
laboratory. 
Viral hemorrhagic fevers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES: 
Infection Control for Viral 
Hemorrhagic Fevers in the 
African Health Care 
Setting 
WHO/EMC/ESR/98.2 
 
Viral Infections of 
Humans; Epidemiology 
and Control. 1989. Evans, 
A.S. (ed). Plenum Medical 
Book Company, New 
York 
Presence of IgM 
antibodies against  Ebola, 
Marburg, CCHF, Lassa or 
Dengue fever 
 
 
or 
 
 
 
Presence of Ebola in post-
mortem skin necropsy 
For ELISA: 
 Whole blood, serum or 
plasma 
 
For PCR: 
Whole blood or blood 
clot,  serum/plasma or 
tissue 
 
For immunohisto-
chemistry: Skin or tissue 
specimens from fatal 
cases. 
Collect specimen from the first 
suspected case. 
If more than one suspected case, 
collect until specimens have been 
collected from 5 to10 suspected 
cases. 
HANDLE AND TRANSPORT 
SPECIMENS FROM SUSPECTED VHF 
PATIENTS WITH EXTREME 
CAUTION. WEAR PROTECTIVE 
CLOTHING AND USE BARRIER 
PRECAUTIONS. 
 
For ELISA or PCR: 
• Refrigerate serum or clot 
• Freeze (-20C or colder) tissue 
specimens for virus isolation 
 
For Immunohistochemistry: 
• Fix skin snip specimen in formalin. 
Specimen can be stored up to 6 
weeks. The specimen is not 
infectious once it is in formalin. 
• Store at room temperature. 
Formalin-fixed specimens may be 
transported at room temperature.  
Diagnostic services for VHF are not 
routinely available. Advance arrangements 
are usually required for VHF diagnostic 
services. Contact the appropriate National 
authority or WHO. 
 
 
 89 
Suspected disease 
or condition Diagnostic test Specimen When to collect 
How to prepare, store and 
transport Results 
Yellow fever 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES: 
 
District guidelines for 
Yellow Fever 
Surveillance, 
WHO/GPVI/EPI/98.09 
 
Yellow Fever. 1998. 
WHO/EPI/Gen/98.11 
ELISA for the presence of 
yellow fever IgM 
antibodies 
Serum Collect specimen from the first 
suspected case of yellow fever. If 
more than 1 suspected case, 
collect until specimens have been 
collected from 5 to 10 suspected 
cases. 
• Collect 10 ml of venous blood from 
adults, 1-5 ml from children. In a 
standard glass test tube, capillary 
tube or microtainer. 
• Separate blood cells from serum: 
– Let clot retract for 30 to 60 
minutes at room temperature. 
Centrifuge at 2000 rpm for 10-
20 minutes and pour off serum 
into a clean glass tube. 
– If no centrifuge, put sample in 
refrigerator overnight (4 to 6 
hours) until clot retracts. Pour 
off serum the next morning. 
– If no centrifuge and no 
refrigerator, let blood sit at an 
angle for at least 60 minutes 
(without shaking or being 
driven in a vehicle. Pour off 
serum into a clean tube. 
• Store serum at 4°C. 
• Transport serum samples using 
appropriate packaging to prevent 
breaking or leaks during transport 
The specimen should arrive at the laboratory 
within 3 days of being collected. 
 
Avoid shaking of specimen before serum 
has been collected. 
To prevent bacterial overgrowth, ensure that 
the serum is poured into a clean glass test 
tube. The test tube does not need to be 
sterile – just clean. 
 
Transport the serum in an EPI hand vaccine 
carrier at 4EC-8EC to prevent bacterial 
overgrowth (up to 7 days). If not 
refrigerated, serum stored in a clean tube 
will be good for at least 3 days. 
 
 
 
